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Abstract
We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in
two directions, which seem particularly relevant for “knowledge workers”. First, after effort
provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the
value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal contracts
may entail properties such as inducing first-best effort and surplus, or non-responsiveness
with respect to changes in verifiable parameters. Moreover, even when socially inefficient,
separation might occur in equilibrium. Except for the latter, these findings are robust to
renegotiation.
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1 Introduction
Motivation In the standard moral hazard model, participation of the agent throughout the
relationship with the principal is taken for granted. That is, after a contract is signed, the agent
chooses his effort, subsequently some output is realized, and finally the agent receives payments
as stipulated by the contract. However, the principal-agent literature has identified a number
of contexts, employment relationships in particular, where despite of a formal contract with
the principal, agents are basically free to leave at any time (see e.g., Harris and Holmstrom,
1982; Holmstrom, 1983; Meyer, 1987; Phelan, 1995; Krueger and Uhlig, 2006; Kra¨kel and
Sliwka, 2009). Potential factors contributing to this phenomenon include the employment-at-
will doctrine in U.S. employment law or difficulties in the course of trying to force participation
on an unwilling employee (see e.g., Malcomson, 1999, p. 2304f.).
In this paper, we consider the issue of freedom to leave in the context of “knowledge workers”
(Drucker, 1959) such as scientists or other specialists whose human capital is crucial for the
principal (see e.g., Pakes and Nitzan, 1983; Anton and Yao, 1995; Lerner and Malmendier,
2010). Indeed, there are estimates that knowledge workers might constitute more than a
quarter of advanced economies’ workforce (see e.g., the January 2006 survey of the Economist or
Roberts, 2004). Importantly, in the course of working on a project for a principal, a knowledge
worker’s effort might also improve his outside opportunities. For example, he might learn about
potential process or product innovations, which he potentially could use outside his relationship
with the principal by starting his own business. In this respect, in a sample of high-growth firms,
Bhide (2000) finds that 71% of entrepreneurs used ideas encountered in previous employment.
Also, through exerting effort (e.g., by conducting R&D), the agent might accumulate crucial
human capital, which might make him an attractive hire for other firms in the industry (see e.g.,
Che, 1995; Bar-Isaac and Shapiro, 2011; Gayle, Golan, and Miller, 2011). In such situations,
a principal will have to take into account that providing strong effort incentives might induce
the agent to leave in the middle of the project. Then, whenever the agent is crucial for project
success, his departure might endanger the principal’s return from it.
In such a context, the following questions arise naturally: How should optimal incentive
contracts be structured in settings where contracts must be sufficiently attractive to retain
the agent? Might it be optimal for the principal to induce separation even if this is socially
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inefficient? Does the additional source of frictions imposed by the agent’s freedom to leave
necessarily have a negative welfare effect?
Framework To address these questions, we employ a workhorse moral hazard model (risk-
neutrality, limited liability, and binary output space) and modify it in the following two ways.1
First, while the principal can commit to the contract terms (i.e., output-dependent payments),
the agent is free to leave.2 In particular, after effort provision the agent learns the realized state
of the world (e.g., to which degree the project holds promise within the firm) and consequently
may opt to separate from the principal in order to pursue some ex-post outside option. Second,
we focus on the case where this ex-post outside option is increasing in the agent’s chosen effort,
and hence endogenous.3
Compared to the standard model, these additional features have a non-trivial impact on
the incentive structure. In particular, the agent’s ex-post participation decision will not only
depend on the terms of the initial contract (which determines his payoff when staying with the
principal), but may also depend on his chosen effort level (which, via the value of his ex-post
outside option, determines his payoff when leaving). As a result, the agent’s optimal effort
and ex-post participation decisions are intertwined, which, compared to the standard model,
makes the principal’s contract design problem substantially more intricate. Consequently, the
main contribution of the paper is to characterize how a principal should optimally structure
incentive contracts in this setting.
Results We show that the contract optimally offered by the principal is either one of two
types: under a no-separation contract, all specified payments are sufficiently large such that
the agent is induced to always stay, which is also the ex-post efficient decision. Alternatively,
under a partial-separation contract, the agent is induced to leave when output within the firm
would be relatively low.
The exact properties of optimal no-separation contracts depend on the size of the first-best
1See e.g., Laffont and Martimort (2002, pp. 194ff.) for a textbook treatment and Tirole (1999) for an
application.
2This is in line with the literature on one-sided commitment discussed above, which argues that in many
settings (such as employment, financing, or insurance), principals will find it easier to commit to initial contract
terms; legally or by other means such as reputation (see e.g., Krueger and Uhlig, 2006).
3In the following, we will frequently omit the term “ex-post” and simply refer to the agent’s “outside option”.
As will become clear, participation ex-ante is always ensured, and hence is not an issue.
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effort level (or put differently, on how strongly effort affects expected surplus). In particular,
there are three relevant cases, each of which may emerge in equilibrium. First, as long as the
first-best effort level is not too large, it is optimally induced by the principal, and the first-best
surplus is realized. In this case, from a welfare perspective, the additional friction imposed
by the agent’s freedom to leave in fact neutralizes the frictions imposed by unobservable effort
and limited liability alone.4 Second, for intermediate levels of first-best effort, the principal
optimally offers exactly the same contract (inducing also the same effort level) in this entire
range of parameters. Hence, while we are in a complete-contracting framework, an outside
observer may perceive the optimal contract as incomplete in the sense of being non-responsive
to changes in the verifiable output (for a detailed discussion of incomplete contracts and their
foundation, see e.g., Tirole, 1999). Third, for sufficiently large first-best effort levels, the im-
plemented effort is again increasing in first-best effort, but it is inefficiently low and, compared
to the standard model with full commitment, the downward distortion is even larger.
Clearly, the principal can always ensure no-separation by stipulating sufficiently attractive
payments. However, we show that for large levels of first-best effort, the principal may strictly
prefer to offer a partial-separation contract, which induces the agent to leave when output
within his relationship with the principal would be relatively low.5 We obtain this finding
despite two assumptions that might suggest otherwise. Namely, we suppose that, in case
of separation, the principal does not realize any output at all and that separation is socially
inefficient. Both of these assumptions could be relaxed without qualitatively affecting our main
results. For example, in the (more realistic) case where the principal still realizes some output
in case of separation, the agent’s departure would be less costly for her, which would then
simply enlarge the parameter range for which the principal optimally induces separation.6 Our
partial-separation result is reminiscent of up-or-out policies, as frequently used in human-capital
intensive industries, such as law or consulting firms (see e.g., Gibbons and Waldmann, 1999;
4In some cases, (employment) contracts stipulate non-compete clauses with the purpose of preventing agents
from using their acquired skills outside the relationship. However, as discussed in Section 5, courts are often
reluctant to enforce such clauses, which, from a welfare perspective, our first-best result seems to corroborate.
5As discussed in Section 5, if the principal cannot commit not to renegotiate, without loss of generality, one
can restrict attention to no-separation contracts, and all of our results with respect to this type of contract
remain intact.
6Similarly, while giving us a clear benchmark, the above assumption that separation is always socially in-
efficient could be relaxed without qualitatively affecting the results (again except for increasing the parameter
range for which separation would occur in equilibrium).
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O’Flaherty and Siow, 1995). Such policies are often enforced informally, for example by offering
an employee a very low bonus or by moving him to a less intriguing job, in order to induce
him to leave “voluntarily”.7 As a further interesting feature of partial-separation contracts,
the agent may in fact be harmed if his ex-post outside option becomes ceteris paribus more
attractive.
Finally, we show that our results are driven by the combination of the agent’s freedom
to leave and the fact that his outside option is endogenous. To this end, we consider a model
variant where the agent is free to leave, but where his outside option is exogenous, i.e., unaffected
by the agent’s effort. In this case, the agent’s effort is fully specific to the relationship with
the principal, it has no (general) external value, and therefore it does not affect the subsequent
participation decision. Compared to the standard model with full-commitment, the payments
under the optimal contract are then simply scaled up by the value of the outside option,
but otherwise the same effort and participation decisions as in the standard model with full-
commitment obtain.
Intuition One crucial difference between the exogenous and endogenous outside option cases
is that in the former, the principal can avoid leaving a rent to the agent at least in some states
of the world (i.e., the agent is then indifferent between staying and leaving in those states). In
the latter case of an endogenous outside option, however, it is not possible for the principal to
make the agent indifferent ex-post between staying and leaving. The reason is that the agent
will in general respond to any given contract by choosing an effort level such that he either
strictly prefers to stay or strictly prefers to leave ex-post. As a result, he will earn a rent in
each state in which he stays with the principal. Consequently, inducing no-separation is more
costly for the principal, and the agent’s rent has properties qualitatively different from both
the standard model and the exogenous outside option case.
At the effort stage, however, the optimal no-separation contract makes the agent indifferent
between choosing an effort level that subsequently induces him to stay in all states and choosing
a different effort level that (depending on parameters) subsequently induces him to either (i)
leave in all states or (ii) leave in the low state only. In the former case, the agent’s payoff
(and hence, his rent) is invariant in the terms of the contract, which makes the principal the
7In Kahn and Huberman (1988), formal up-or-out rules are rationalized in a setting with both hidden action
(by the agent) and hidden information ex-post (by the principal).
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residual claimant (who then finds it optimal to provide first-best incentives). In the latter
case, the agent’s rent is increasing in effort, which leads the principal to optimally distort the
induced effort below first-best, and potentially even below the effort level that would obtain in
the standard model (the reason being that the agent’s marginal rent has an additional term to
ensure that separation does not occur). Moreover, at the boundary between these two cases
the agent’s marginal rent makes a discrete jump from zero to strictly positive, and so does
the principal’s marginal virtual cost of inducing a given effort level. Consequently, even as the
marginal benefit of more effort increases, there exists a parameter range where the principal
keeps the implemented effort level constant; resulting in non-responsiveness of the optimal
contract in that range.
When the effort level that the principal intends to implement is large, inducing no-separation
becomes very costly because, in this case, the agent’s rent is increasing in effort. Hence, as it
allows to reduce the agent’s rent, the principal might prefer to induce partial-separation. In
this case, the principal free-rides on the (external) effort incentives generated by the agent’s
endogenous outside option. Moreover, the effort incentives generated through the outside option
respectively the contract may be substitutes, and hence a more attractive outside option may
lead the principal to reduce the contractual payments, which, in total, might even reduce the
agent’s expected payoff.
Related literature The present paper studies optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard
framework where the agent is free to exercise some (ex-post) outside option that is endogenous
(i.e., determined by the effort chosen inside the contractual relationship with the principal).
Hence, it is related to the following three strands of the literature:
First, there is an early strand of research on labor markets with one-sided commitment
where the agent is free to leave but the principal can commit to the contract terms (for an
overview, see e.g., Meyer, 1987). For example, in order to analyze career wage profiles, Harris
and Holmstrom (1982) and Holmstrom (1983) study optimal insurance problems in the context
of dynamic principal-agent setups where ex-ante effort provision plays, however, no role.8 More
closely related, in one of the first papers to discuss limited liability in a (static) moral hazard
8Phelan (1995) and Krueger and Uhlig (2006) consider related setups to study optimal dynamic consumption
profiles. Note that in Krueger and Uhlig (2006) the term “endogenous outside option” is used to describe an
outside option whose value is determined by competition among principals.
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framework, Sappington (1983) considers a setting with hidden information: after having entered
the relationship with the principal, the agent receives private information on a productivity
shock and may decide to leave the principal before providing effort.
Second, a prominent strand in this one-sided commitment literature deals with labor mo-
bility, studying situations where “knowledge workers” (such as scientists or engineers) may
walk away in the course of a project (e.g., in order to start their own business), which might
endanger the principal’s project return. For example, in a seminal paper, Pakes and Nitzan
(1983) investigate optimal separation decisions of firms and workers in a complete information
framework where effort is fixed, resulting in efficient retention decisions in all possible states
of the world. Building on Pakes and Nitzan (1983), Anton and Yao (1995) also abstract from
effort provision, but analyze a situation where the agent has private information on the value
of an innovation which, when leaving the principal, he may exploit to form a start-up business.
They show that there might be inefficient separation ex-post, the extent of which depends on
the degree of asset complementarity and the nature of competition. In a recent paper, Lerner
and Malmendier (2010) study a phenomenon that is related to issues of labor mobility but does
not necessarily imply that the agent (completely) leaves the principal. For the biotechnology
industry, Lerner and Malmendier (2010) document that “project substitution” seems to be a
major concern of financing firms, who worry that (instead of solely focussing on completing the
project) start-up entrepreneurs may spend time and resources on work for alternative alliances,
own products, or even academic papers, all of which may lead to a dissipation of the project
returns.
Third, with respect to endogenous outside options, potential effects of effort on an agent’s
outside opportunities have not received much attention in the moral hazard literature. Recent
exceptions are Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2011), Che (1995), and Gayle, Golan, and Miller (2011),
who consider models where the agent, by exerting effort, accumulates human capital, from
which he may benefit when joining other firms at later contracting stages. The latter paper
conducts an empirical analysis of executive compensation. The former two papers focus on
the issue of “revolving doors”, where, after finishing his term, an agent might join a firm he
previously was supposed to regulate or monitor.9 Potential outside effects of effort are also a
9Netzer and Scheuer (2010) augment Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1990) setup of renegotiation in moral hazard
models by assuming that the (risk-averse) agent is free to leave. They study how ex-post competition among
various principals affects the risk versus incentive trade-off in a setting with no commitment.
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central feature in the literature on career concerns (see e.g., Holmstrom, 1999; Dewatripont,
Jewitt, and Tirole, 1999). There, over time, the principal (and potential alternative employ-
ers) receive information about the agent’s unobservable productivity type by observing output
(which depends on both the agent’s type and his unobservable effort). In the simplest ver-
sion, there are no output-contingent contracts, and in each period the agent’s outside option is
based on his assessed ability.10 Consequently, through his current effort choice, the agent aims
to influence the principal’s (and the outside market’s) learning process. More closely related,
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) consider the interaction of internal incentives (through explicit
incentive contracts) and external incentives (through career concerns) to study their relative
importance over the career horizon.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and the
first-best benchmark. Section 3 derives optimal agent behavior for a given contract. Section 4
contains our main results: we characterize optimal no-separation contracts and optimal partial-
separation contracts, as well as the principal’s ultimate choice between the two. Section 5 in
turn discusses non-compete clauses, the exogenous outside option case as well as two robustness
checks: we show that the set of contracts considered is without loss of generality, and we discuss
the issue of renegotiation. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
Basic framework We consider an extension of a standard moral-hazard model with a prin-
cipal (she) and an agent (he), where both are risk-neutral and where the agent faces a limited-
liability constraint.11 The sequence of events is as follows (see Figure 1): The principal needs
the agent to conduct some project and, at date 1, proposes a (take-it-or-leave-it) contract to
the agent (feasible contracts will be discussed below). When deciding whether or not to accept
the offer, we follow the standard model in that the agent’s (ex-ante) reservation utility is a
constant, which we set to zero.
At date 2, the agent exerts unobservable effort e ∈ [0, 1], which stochastically influences
10Note that, similar to the present paper, in career concern models the agent is in principle free to leave, but
the focus is on potential separation after output has been realized.
11As is well-known, in the absence of limited liability, the first-best outcome can easily be implemented, for
example, by a sell-the-shop contract.
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which state of the world s ∈ {s, s} is realized at date 3, where s > s > 0, and where ∆s ≡ s−s.
In particular, we assume Prob(s = s) = e and Prob(s = s) = 1− e, so that higher effort makes
s = s more likely. Effort costs are given by c (e) = 12e
2; a simplifying assumption, which is not
crucial for our results.
In addition, the agent’s effort choice not only affects the expected surplus of the relationship
with the principal, but also the (expected) value v(e) of the agent’s ex-post outside option that
he might pursue at date 4 after having privately learned the state s at date 3. As discussed
above, the agent might, for example, acquire some knowledge in the course of the project that
he can also profitably use outside the relationship with the principal, i.e., v′(e) > 0. In line
with the literature on knowledge workers, we assume that v(e) is not verifiable, which seems
to be particularly plausible if v(e) is a measure of the agent’s potential future earnings (e.g.,
due to improved human capital). For example, in their empirical study, Gayle, Golan, and
Miller (2011) reject the hypothesis that general human capital acquired by executives on-the-
job is perfectly observable to the outside market. Instead, it seems to have a considerable
private-information component. In combination with the agent’s wealth constraint, the above
assumption rules out contracts where the agent promises to transfer potential gains from sep-
aration to the principal. In what follows, similar to Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2011) and Che
(1995), we assume that v(e) is linear in the agent’s effort. In particular, v(e) = λe so that the
parameter λ > 0 measures the intensity of the agent’s effort on his ex-post outside option.
We assume that, if the agent decides to stay at date 4 (i.e., if he “completes the project”),
the principal’s verifiable gross profit at date 5 is simply s. If, on the other hand, the agent
leaves, we assume that the principal’s gross profit is zero. However, we show that even under
this stark assumption, she might still find it optimal to induce separation. Importantly, as
discussed in the Introduction, this assumption could be relaxed without qualitatively affecting
our main results. In particular, if the principal would realize at least some positive payoff when
 
payoffs 
realized 
5 4 
ex-post 
participation 
decision
date 2 3 
contract effort state 
realized 
1 
Figure 1: Sequence of events
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the agent leaves (and hence the agent’s departure would be less harmful to her), separation
would simply occur in a larger range of parameter values. Furthermore, in order to have a clear
benchmark, we assume that, independent of e, separation is inefficient ex-post, i.e., λ < s.12
Informational assumptions and contract space While the agent’s effort and his ex-post
outside option are non-contractible (see the discussion above), the gross profit realized by the
principal at date 5 (which is s, s, or 0 in case the agent leaves) is observable and verifiable.
Therefore, the initial contract may specify payments that may depend on the realized gross
profit and that, due to the agent’s limited liability, have to be non-negative. In principle, the
contract may also condition on messages that, after date 3, the agent sends about his effort
level and the realized state. However, we show in Section 5 that, akin to the standard moral
hazard model, for any incentive-compatible message-dependent contract there exists a contract
that does not condition on messages and leads to the same equilibrium outcome (i.e., effort
level, ex-post participation decisions, and payoffs). Moreover, as is also shown in Section 5,
from the principal’s perspective, it can neither be optimal to promise a positive payment if the
gross profit is zero (i.e., if the agent leaves) nor to specify a payment when s is realized that
exceeds the payment when s is realized. Hence, without loss of generality, in the following we
restrict attention to contracts of the form t ∈ T+ ≡ {(t, t) | t ≥ t ≥ 0}, where t and t denote
the transfers to the agent if the realized gross profit is given by s and s, respectively.
As discussed in the Introduction, we focus on a setting with one-sided commitment only:
while the principal can commit to the payments specified in the contract, the agent cannot
be forced (or simply promise) to stay. That is, contracts that prohibit the agent to leave at
intermediate stages of the project are not feasible. Consequently, if the principal intends to
induce the participation of the agent throughout the entire project, she must structure the
contractually promised payments in a way that gives the agent an incentive to stay.
Payoffs Given the discussion above, from an ex-ante perspective, the principal’s expected
payoff is
e · (s− t) · I + (1− e) · (s− t) · I, (1)
12Again, relaxing this assumption would simply increase the parameter range for which separation would occur
in equilibrium.
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while for the agent we have
e · [t · I + v(e) · (1− I)]+ (1− e) · [t · I + v(e) · (1− I)]− c(e). (2)
I and I are indicator variables that are equal to 1 if, at date 4, the agent decides to stay with
the principal in state s and s, respectively, and that are zero otherwise. Note that (1) and (2)
immediately imply that ex-ante participation is not an issue. That is, the principal can always
secure herself a payoff of at least zero by proposing the contract t = t = 0, while the agent can
secure himself a payoff of at least zero by choosing e = 0.
First-best Note that the assumption λ < s together with e ∈ [0, 1] implies v(e) < s for all e
and s, and hence, from a first-best perspective, the agent should never leave the principal at
stage 4. Consequently, the first-best effort level eFB is given by
eFB(∆s) ≡ argmax
e
{
es+ (1− e)s− 1
2
e2
}
= min(∆s, 1), (3)
and, as e = 0 is feasible, the resulting first-best social surplus is strictly positive. Note that
the first-best effort level depends on the spread ∆s = s− s only.
3 Optimal agent behavior for a given contract
In this section, we characterize the optimal agent behavior for a given contract t, where we
proceed in four steps. In step 1, we derive the agent’s optimal ex-post participation decision
at date 4 (Lemma 1). This decision will, in general, depend on both the contract and the
previously chosen effort level: the latter affects the value of the agent’s outside option, which
in combination with the contract terms is crucial for his (optimal) decision to stay or leave.
It turns out that, when taking into account the agent’s optimal ex-post participation decision,
the functional form of his payoff U(e, t) varies across the contract space. Consequently, in order
to ultimately derive the agent’s optimal effort level, in a preliminary step 2, we characterize
U(e, t) (Lemma 2). In step 3, we establish that the number of candidate optimal effort level is
limited (Lemma 3). Finally, in step 4, we show that the contract space can be partitioned in
three subsets of contracts that differ with respect to the agent’s ex-post participation decisions
that emerge in equilibrium. In combination with our previous results, this will then allow to
fully characterize the agent’s optimal behavior for any given contract (Proposition 1).
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Step 1: Ex-post participation At date 4, the state s is already known to the agent, so
that his ex-post participation decision depends on the respective payment t or t as stipulated
in the contract as well as the previously chosen effort level (which leads to an outside option
of λe). Clearly, for s given, the agent will optimally stay as long as the payment from the
principal (weakly) exceeds the agent’s outside option. Hence, in state s (s) the agent optimally
stays if t ≥ λe (t ≥ λe) holds.13 Put differently, in state s (s), the agent optimally stays if and
only if the previously chosen effort level is weakly below some threshold value, i.e., if e ≤ tλ
(e ≤ tλ) holds. Note that t ≥ t implies that it can never be optimal for the agent to stay when
s = s, but to leave when s = s.
Lemma 1 (Optimal ex-post participation at date 4) For a given contract t ∈ T+, the
agent’s optimal participation decision at date 4 may depend on the previously chosen effort level
e. In particular,
(i) for low effort levels e ∈ E2(t) ≡ {e | e ≤ tλ}, he stays in both states,
(ii) for intermediate effort levels e ∈ E1(t) ≡ {e | tλ < e ≤ tλ}, he stays in state s only, and
(iii) for high effort levels e ∈ E0(t) ≡ {e | e > tλ}, he stays in neither state.
Note that, depending on the underlying contract t, the sets E1(t) and E0(t) might be
empty (see Figure 2). That is, for a given contract t, independent of the chosen effort level, the
respective ex-post participation decision(s) will not occur in equilibrium. Put differently, when
taking into account the agent’s optimal ex-post participation decisions, in each of the cases (i),
(ii), and (iii) of Figure 2 the functional form of the agent’s payoff (see (2))
U(e, t) ≡ e ·max(t, λe) + (1− e) ·max(t, λe)− c(e), (4)
will be different, and its exact functional form depends on the underlying contract t. This issue
is crucial for determining the agent’s optimal effort choice and will be considered next.
Step 2: Characterizing the agent’s payoff function To determine which of the sets
E0(t), E1(t), and E2(t) are non-empty, note that (except for knife-edge cases) one of the
following three situations may emerge for a given contract (see Figure 2): First, for the type
13Note that we assume that the agent stays when indifferent, which is also the socially efficient choice.
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of contract depicted in panel (i) both critical values tλ and
t
λ (see Lemma 1) are in the interior
of the effort space [0, 1]. Hence, in this case it depends on the previously chosen effort level
(and hence the induced value of the agent’s outside option) whether the agent decides to stay
in both states (for e ∈ E2(t) = [0, tλ ]), in state s = s only (for e ∈ E1(t) = ( tλ , tλ ]), or whether
he decides to stay in neither state (for e ∈ E0(t) = ( tλ , 1]).
 
0 1
e 
t

t

(i) E2(t) E1(t) E0(t)
0 1
e 
t
  
t
  
(ii) E2(t) E1(t)
0 1
e 
t
  
(iii) E2(t) 
Figure 2: Partition of the effort space induced by a given contract: 3 examples
Second, for contracts such as the one depicted in panel (ii), even when choosing maximum
effort (thereby also maximizing his outside option), the agent does not find it optimal to leave
in state s = s. For such contracts, the set E0(t) is empty. However, and similar to panel
(i), it still depends on the agent’s effort level whether he optimally stays in both states (for
e ∈ E2(t) = [0, tλ ]) or in state s = s only (for e ∈ E1(t) = ( tλ , 1]). Finally, as for panel (iii),
even the payment t is sufficiently attractive such that, independent of his outside option, the
agent prefers to stay in both states of the world. Here, both E1(t) and E0(t) are empty, and
we have E2(t) = [0, 1]. This leads to the following result (illustrated in Figure 3):
Lemma 2 (Agent’s payoff function given optimal ex-post participation decisions)
(i) For a given contract t ∈ T+ and optimal ex-post participation decisions, the agent’s
expected payoff is given by
U(e, t) =

U2(e, t) ≡ e · t+ (1− e) · t− 12e2 if e ∈ E2(t)
U1(e, t) ≡ e · t+ (1− e) · λe− 12e2 if e ∈ E1(t)
U0(e, t) ≡ λe− 12e2 if e ∈ E0(t),
(5)
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where (a) E2(t), E1(t), E0(t) 6= ∅ for t < λ,14 (b) E2(t), E1(t) 6= ∅ and E0(t) = ∅ for
t < λ ≤ t, and (c) E2(t) 6= ∅ and E1(t) = E0(t) = ∅ for t ≥ λ,
(ii) U(e, t) is continuous in e, and U2(e, t), U1(e, t), and U0(e, t) are strictly concave in e.
(iii)
∂U2(e=
t
λ
,t)
∂e <
∂U1(e=
t
λ
,t)
∂e for t < λ, and
∂U1(e=
t
λ
,t)
∂e <
∂U0(e=
t
λ
,t)
∂e for t > 0.
 
E2(t), E1(t) 
E2(t), E1(t), E0(t) 
 E2(t) 
0 t  
t  

Δt=0 
Figure 3: Non-empty sets Ej(t) depending on the underlying contract t
Step 3: Candidate optimal effort levels Given the payoff function (5), the agent’s optimal
effort choice e∗(t) solves
e∗(t) ∈ arg max
e∈[0,1]
U(e, t). (6)
Note that solving (6) is non-trivial. First, the chosen effort may affect the agent’s subsequent
ex-post participation decision. Hence, the agent has to decide from which of the effort intervals
Ej(t) to select his effort (where, for a given contract, some of these intervals may not exist (see
Lemma 2)). Second, as (5) is piece-wise defined, there might, in principle, be a corner solution
at one of the threshold values tλ or
t
λ . However, one can show that such corner solutions
play only a limited role. For an illustration, consider Figure 2 (i), where tλ ,
t
λ ∈ (0, 1) holds.
Lemma 2 (iii) implies that, at the threshold value tλ , the slope of U(e, t) makes a positive
jump, because for all e ∈ E1(t) the agent leaves in state s, in which case his payoff λe is
increasing in e. An analogous argument applies to the boundary between the sets E1(t) and
14For the knife-edge case t = t < λ, we have E1(t) = ∅.
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E0(t). Intuitively, these observations imply that choosing e =
t
λ respectively e =
t
λ cannot be
optimal for the agent. In particular, we show below that, with the possible exception of being
equal to one, the optimal effort level will satisfy an appropriate first-order condition. To this
end, for j ∈ {0, 1, 2}, implicitly define e∗j (t) by ∂Uj(e,t)∂e = 0, where it follows from (5) that15
e∗2(t) = ∆t, e
∗
1(t) =
t+ λ
2λ+ 1
, and e∗0(t) = λ. (7)
Lemma 3 (Candidate optimal effort levels for a given contract) For all t ∈ T+,
(i) if e∗(t) < 1, then, in both states of the world, the agent’s equilibrium ex-post participation
constraint is not binding, i.e., e∗(t) /∈ { tλ , tλ}, and
(ii) there exists some j ∈ {0, 1, 2} such that e∗(t) = min(e∗j (t), 1) and min(e∗j (t), 1) ∈ Ej(t).
For any interior effort level, Lemma 3 (i) implies that, if the principal wants the agent to
stay in a given state, the agent necessarily reaps a rent in this state. This makes inducing
participation more costly compared to the standard model with full commitment, where the
agent reaps a rent in some states only.
Step 4: Optimal agent behavior for a given contract Part (ii) of Lemma 3 is useful
because, as will be shown below, it leads to a partition of the contract space T+ into three
subsets T0, T1, and T2 that differ with respect to the induced equilibrium ex-post participation
decisions (for a preview, see Figure 4). Intuitively, in the set of full-separation contracts T0,
the stipulated payments are relatively low in both states such that the agent’s outside option
becomes relatively attractive. Consequently, the agent will optimally choose a relatively high
effort level, and he will optimally stay in neither state. In contrast, in the set of no-separation
contracts T2, both payments are sufficiently high such that the agent will optimally choose
a relatively low effort level (which keeps his outside option low), and he will optimally stay
with the principal in both states. Finally, as for the set of partial-separation contracts T1, only
payment t is sufficiently large, which will induce the agent to choose an intermediate effort level
such that he will optimally stay with the principal in the high state only.
Before stating the formal result, we define a boundary function b(t), illustrated in Figure 4,
that delineates the sets T0, T1, and T2 and simplifies their formal characterization in Proposition
15Note that e∗j (t) does not necessarily lie in Ej(t) (or in [0, 1] for that matter), but, of course, the subsequent
results take these restrictions into account.
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1 below. Moreover, this boundary function will play a crucial role when deriving the principal’s
optimal choice of contract in Section 4. To simplify the subsequent exposition, note that both
U0(e, t) and e
∗
0(t) = λ are independent of t. Consequently, (under slight abuse of notation)
define U0 ≡ U0(min(λ, 1), t).
 
0 t  
t  
t′
T2 
T0 T1 
 Δt=0 
 Δt=1 
bt
t′′ t′′′
Figure 4: Sets of full-, partial-, and no-separation contracts
Definition 1 (Boundary function) Define a (continuous) function b : t→ t as follows:
(i) for t ∈ [t′, t′′]: b(t) is implicitly defined by U2(e∗2(t), t) = U0
(ii) for t ∈ [t′′, t′′′]: b(t) is implicitly defined by U2(e∗2(t), t) = U1(e∗1(t), t), and
(iii) for t ∈ [t′′′,∞): b(t) = λ
where t
′ ≡ U0, t′′ is implicitly defined by U1(e∗1(t), t) = U0, and t′′′ ≡ 1 + λ, and where
0 < t
′
< t
′′
< t
′′′
holds.
This section’s main result can now be stated as follows:
Proposition 1 (Optimal agent behavior for a given contract) The contract space T+
can be partitioned into three (non-empty) subsets T0, T1, and T2 that differ in the equilib-
rium ex-post participation decision of the agent. In particular, for a given contract t ∈ Tj,
j ∈ {0, 1, 2}, the agent selects equilibrium effort e∗(t) = min(e∗j (t), 1) and subsequently chooses
to stay with the principal in j states of the world. Formally, the sets T0, T1, and T2 are defined
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by T2 ≡ { t ∈ T+ | t ≥ b(t) and t ≥ t′}, T1 ≡ { t ∈ T+ | t < b(t) and t ≥ t′′}, and T0 ≡ T+ \
(T2∪T1), where the continuous boundary function b(t) is decreasing and concave for t ∈ [t′, t′′],
and increasing and concave with a slope of less than 1 for t ∈ [t′′, t′′′], and where b(t′) = t′.
As for the optimal effort level e∗(t), it follows from Proposition 1 that
e∗(t) =

e∗2(t) if t ∈ T2 and ∆t ≤ 1,
e∗1(t) if t ∈ T1 and t ≤ t′′′,
min(λ, 1) if t ∈ T0, and
1 otherwise
(8)
with e∗2(t) and e∗1(t) as given in (7). As the boundary function b(t) will be crucial throughout,
some more intuition regarding its shape is useful.16 First, to see why it is decreasing in the
interval [t
′
, t
′′
], recall from Definition 1 that on this part of the graph of b(t) it has to hold that
U2(e
∗
2(t), t) = U0. Note that U0 is constant in the (t, t)-space, and, from (5) and the Envelope-
Theorem, it follows that
∂U2(e∗2(t),t)
∂t
= e∗2(t) ≥ 0 and ∂U2(e
∗
2(t),t)
∂t = 1− e∗2(t) > 0. Hence, a lower
t is required to keep the agent indifferent when raising t, and vice versa. Second, in the interval
[t
′′
, t
′′′
], b(t) is implicitly defined by U2(e
∗
2(t), t) = U1(e
∗
1(t), t). Note that
∂U1(e∗1(t),t)
∂t
= e∗1(t),
which again follows from (5) and the Envelope-Theorem. Moreover, the boundary between
the sets T2 and T1 is located in a part of the contract space where e
∗
2(t) < e
∗
1(t) holds (see
the proof of Proposition 1). Consequently, a higher t raises U1(e
∗
1(t), t) by more than it raises
U2(e
∗
2(t), t). Hence, to keep the agent indifferent as t increases, t must go up as well because
it affects U2(e
∗
2(t), t), but not U1(e
∗
1(t), t) (see (5)). Finally, note that since neither U0 nor
U1(e
∗
1(t), t) depend on t, the boundary between the regions T0 and T1 is a vertical line at
t = t
′′
.
16Note that, given a contract on the part of the graph of b(t) where t ∈ [t′, t′′] holds, the agent is indifferent
between the effort level e∗2(t) ∈ E2(t) and the effort level min(e∗0(t), 1) ∈ E0(t). However, it will become clear
in Section 4 on optimal contracts that, on the equilibrium path, these indifferences are resolved in favor of e∗2(t)
(which also constitutes the socially efficient behavior). This is already taken into account in the definition of
the set T2 that is assumed to include the respective part of the graph of b(t). Similar considerations apply when
resolving indifferences in the definitions of T2, T1, and T0.
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4 Optimal contracts
Taking into account the agent’s optimal behavior for a given contract (as characterized in
Proposition 1), an optimal contract maximizes the principal’s expected payoff (see (1))
Π(t) ≡ e∗(t) · (s− t) · I + (1− e∗(t)) · (s− t) · I, (9)
where I (I) is equal to one iff t ≥ λe∗(t) (t ≥ λe∗(t)), and zero otherwise. It also follows
from Proposition 1 that the principal faces a choice between three types of contracts (i.e.,
contracts from the sets T2, T1, and T0, respectively) that differ in the induced effort and ex-post
participation decisions; thereby leading to either no-, partial-, or full-separation. However, note
that the principal’s payoff in the latter case is zero, while it will turn out that she can always
secure a strictly positive payoff by instead choosing an appropriate no-separation or partial-
separation contract.17 Consequently, the search for the optimal contract can be restricted to
the former two contract types. Hence, we first characterize optimal no-separation and partial-
separation contracts, respectively (Propositions 2 and 3). We then compare these two contract
types to determine the “globally” optimal contract ultimately chosen by the principal. Thereby,
depending on parameters, either contract type can be strictly optimal (Proposition 4).
The optimal no-separation contract When the principal offers a no-separation contract
t ∈ T2, then from Proposition 1, the agent chooses effort e∗(t) = min(∆t, 1) and (optimally)
stays in both states of the world. It turns out that, in her search for the optimal no-separation
contract, the principal can narrow down the set of candidate optimal contracts considerably to
include only the upper bold line of Figure 5, which corresponds to the graph of the boundary
function b(t) over the interval [t
′
, t
′′′
].
Intuitively, as e∗(t) = min(∆t, 1), it cannot be optimal for the principal to choose ∆t > 1,
because there would exist a contract with ∆t = 1 that would induce the same effort at lower
cost. Moreover, for any given effort ∆t the principal optimally sets t as low as possible. In the
standard model with full commitment, this leads to t = 0 which, however, in our setup would
induce the agent to leave for s = s. Rather, to implement a given effort level ∆t , the respective
payment t must be sufficiently high to avoid separation. Consider the upper bold line of Figure
5 and note that effort levels ∆t can be depicted as lines parallel to the main diagonal. Hence,
17This is shown formally in the proof of Proposition 4.
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the cost-minimizing payment t is given by the left-most point on the respective parallel line
that is still inside T2, i.e., the optimal contract implementing a given ∆t lies in the (unique)
point of intersection of the respective parallel with b(t).18
0 t  
t  
t′
T2 
T0 T1 
Δt0
Δt1
t′′ t′′′
ΔtΔt′′
bt
Figure 5: Candidate optimal contracts
In analogy to the standard model, the optimal no-separation contract exhibits the natural
feature that the effort level e = ∆t optimally implemented by the principal does not depend on
the absolute levels s and s, but depends on the spread ∆s only, and is (weakly) increasing in
∆s. However, the principal’s need to set both payments sufficiently high (to avoid separation
ex-post) leads to properties of optimal no-separation contracts that are markedly different from
the standard model.
Proposition 2 (Optimal no-separation contract) For given (s, s), the optimal contract
in the set T2 has the following properties:
(i) To induce some effort level e = ∆t ≤ 1, it is given by t = (b(t), t) satisfying t− b(t) = ∆t.
(ii) The effort level e = ∆t optimally induced by the principal depends on ∆s only, and is
continuous and weakly increasing in ∆s (see Figure 6). Formally,
18Proposition 1 implies that there is a unique point of intersection because t
′ − b(t′) = 0, t − b(t) is strictly
increasing in t for t ∈ [t′, t′′′], and t′′′ − b(t′′′) = 1.
18
∆t =

∆s = eFB(∆s) if ∆s ∈ (0,∆t′′],
∆t′′ = const. < eFB(∆s) if ∆s ∈ (∆t′′,∆sI ],
∆s
2 −
√
1+2λ−1
2 < e
FB(∆s) if ∆s ∈ (∆sI ,∆sII ],
1 if ∆s > ∆sII ,
where 0 < ∆t′′ ≡ t′′ − b(t′′) < ∆sI ≡ 2∆t′′ +
√
1 + 2λ− 1 < ∆sII ≡ 1 +
√
1 + 2λ.
In our view, the most interesting property of the optimal no-separation contract is that
the additional source of frictions (limited commitment in addition to moral hazard and limited
liability) does not necessarily lead to higher agency costs in equilibrium. To the contrary, it
might turn out to be welfare-improving, and even first-best effort incentives (and hence, first-
best surplus) might be induced by the principal.19 Moreover, as shown in Proposition 4 below,
whenever ∆s ≤ ∆t′′ the optimal no-separation contract not only leads to first-best incentives
but is also “globally” optimal for the principal.
λ s  
s  
ΔsΔsII  
ΔsΔsI  
Δs0 
ΔsΔt′′  
Figure 6: Regions of optimal no-separation contracts (Proposition 2)
To gain an intuition, note that the discussion above Proposition 2 implies that the principal’s
problem of maximizing (9) can be transformed into the one-dimensional problem of finding the
optimal t ∈ [t′, t′′′]. This is so because each point on the graph of b(t) (and hence, each effort
19At the same time, the principal’s equilibrium payoff is lower than in the standard model with full commit-
ment, because the optimal no-separation contract has to satisfy the additional constraints of inducing participa-
tion ex-post. The fact that additional frictions may lead to a higher social surplus has also been observed when
restricting the set of feasible contracts (Aghion and Hermalin, 1990) or when introducing additional information
asymmetries (Schmitz, 2004).
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level e = ∆t) is identified by a unique value of t. Moreover, it follows from Proposition 1 and
(9) that for all t ∈ T2 that satisfy ∆t ≤ 1, we have Π(t) = W (t) − U2(e∗2(t), t), where W (t)
denotes the social surplus as a function of t, i.e.,
W (t) ≡ Π(t) + U(e∗(t), t) for t ∈ T+. (10)
These observations in combination with Definition 1 imply that the principal’s problem can be
stated as finding the t ∈ [t′, t′′′] that maximizes
Π(t) = W (t)−
{
U0 if t ∈ [t′, t′′]
U1(e
∗
1(t), t) if t ∈ [t′′, t′′′]
(11)
under the constraint that t = b(t).
The intuition behind Proposition 2 then follows naturally from the properties of (11) (see
also Figure 6 for an illustration). First, as long as ∆s is not too large, the principal finds it
optimal to implement a relatively small effort level, and she achieves this by choosing some
t < t
′′
. It follows from (11) that, in this range, her payoff is equal to the social surplus minus
a constant; making her residual claimant and implying the optimality of first-best incentives.
Second, there exists an intermediate range of ∆s for which the optimal t (and hence, the
induced effort level) is constant in ∆s (and below first-best effort). Intuitively, note from (11)
that for t ≥ t′′, the agent’s payoff is given by U1(e∗1(t), t). Moreover, recall that U1(e∗1(t), t)
depends on t only and
∂U1(e∗1(t),t)
∂t
= e∗1(t) > 0 for t ∈ [t′′, t′′′]. Hence, while for t < t′′ the agent’s
marginal rent is zero, it jumps to e∗1(t) at t = t
′′
. Due to this jump in the marginal rent, the
principal’s benefit from raising t must be sufficiently large to make it worthwhile to raise t
beyond t
′′
, explaining why for an entire range of ∆s the optimal t remains constant at t
′′
.
Finally, as ∆s increases further, by choosing some t ∈ (t′′, t′′′), the principal optimally
induces some effort level that is again strictly increasing in ∆s. In this case, the agent’s
marginal rent e∗1(t) is larger (and hence, the implemented effort is lower) than in the standard
model with full commitment, where the induced effort is given by min(∆s2 , 1) (see Proposition
5). The reason is that, to induce a higher effort level and to avoid separation, the principal
has to raise both t and t, which is in contrast to the standard model where a higher effort is
induced by raising the payment in the good state only.
The optimal partial-separation contract As shown in Proposition 1, when offered a
partial-separation contract t ∈ T1, the agent exerts effort e∗(t) = min( t+λ2λ+1 , 1) and optimally
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stays in state s = s only. In a first step, we argue that in the set T1, without loss of generality,
one can restrict attention to contracts where t = 0 (i.e., those located on the lower bold line
of Figure 5): the agent leaves if state s is realized, which implies that Π(t) does not depend
on t. Moreover, payments t > t
′′′
cannot be optimal for the principal as they would induce the
same effort level of 1 as a contract stipulating t = t
′′′
, but at a higher cost. These observations
imply that (in order to find the optimal partial-separation contract) the principal’s problem of
maximizing (9) can be restated as finding the t ∈ [t′′, t′′′] that maximizes
Π(t) = W (t)− U1(e∗1(t), t) =
(
t+ λ
1 + 2λ
)
· (s− t). (12)
As Π(t) is independent of s, compared to the no-separation case, the characterization of the
optimal partial-separation contract is substantially less complex:
Proposition 3 (Optimal partial-separation contract) For given (s, s), the optimal con-
tract in the set T1 has the following properties:
(i) The payment t is irrelevant, and, without loss of generality, some contract of the form
t = 0 and t ∈ [t′′, t′′′] is optimal.
(ii) The effort optimally induced by the principal and the required payment t are independent
of s, and continuous and weakly increasing in s (see Figure 7). In particular,
t =

t
′′
if s ∈ (0, sI ], implying e = t
′′
+λ
2λ+1
s−λ
2 if s ∈ (sI , sII ], implying e = s+λ4λ+2
t
′′′
if s ∈ (sII ,∞), implying e = 1
where sI ≡ 2t′′ + λ < sII ≡ 2t′′′ + λ.
The optimal partial-separation contract has a number of interesting properties. First, for
s = s it induces separation, which is socially inefficient because our assumption λ < s implies
e∗(t)λ < s. Second, separation in state s is induced through a sufficiently unattractive payment
t = 0 such that the agent prefers to leave. This feature is reminiscent of up-or-out policies,
which (similar to the present case) are often enforced informally (e.g., by offering an employee
a very low bonus, by moving him to a less intriguing job, or by making clear his lacking career
options), thereby inducing the employee to leave voluntarily.20
20See Walker (2005) for empirical evidence on such implicit up-or-out policies in a large manufacturing firm.
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λ s  
s  
 sIIsI 
Δs0
Figure 7: Regions of optimal partial-separation contracts (Proposition 3)
Third, the agent may in fact be harmed by a more attractive outside option, i.e., the
agent’s equilibrium payoff may be decreasing in λ.21 To see this, denote the optimal partial-
separation contract by t1 = (0, t1) where t1 denotes the optimal payment in state s as identified
in Proposition 3. Moreover, suppose s < sII such that the induced effort level is interior. Then,
the derivative of the agent’s expected payoff with respect to λ is given by
e∗1(t1) ·
∂t1
∂λ
+ (1− e∗1(t1)) · e∗1(t1), (13)
which follows from (5), Proposition 1, and the Envelope-Theorem.22 The second term in (13)
is a direct, positive effect: a larger λ implies a larger payoff for the agent in the state where he
leaves. The first term denotes an indirect effect that turns out to be negative. Intuitively, as
long as the induced effort level is interior, t1 and λ (as internal respectively external sources of
effort incentives) are substitutes. That is, a larger λ reduces the positive effect of t1 on effort.
Hence, the principal optimally responds to a larger λ by reducing t1. It turns out that, for
s ∈ (sI , sII) and λ > 1, this negative, indirect effect in fact dominates the positive direct effect,
and the agent’s expected payoff is decreasing in λ.23
21Wickelgren (2009) shows that an improved outside option can worsen a player’s payoff in a bargaining game
with strategic delay.
22Note that both the optimal partial-separation contract t1 and the effort level e
∗
1(t1) directly depend on λ (see
Proposition 3 and the discussion above Lemma 3), which is taken into account when obtaining the derivative.
23Formally, in this parameter range, e∗1(t1) =
t1+λ
2λ+1
, and hence the agent’s expected payoff is (s+λ)
2
8(1+2λ)
, which is
strictly decreasing in λ iff s > 1+λ. At the same time, it can be shown that sI ≡ 2t′′+λ = 2
√
4λ2 − 1−λ > 1+λ,
which implies the result.
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The globally optimal contract It remains to determine which of the two candidate optimal
contracts (as characterized in Propositions 2 and 3) the principal ultimately prefers. It turns
out that either contract type may be strictly optimal. In particular, there always exists a
parameter region in the (s, s)-space where a partial-separation contract is optimal for the
principal. To see this, consider Figure 8 (which combines Figures 6 and 7) and the following
“revealed preference” argument.
 
λ s  
s  
ΔsΔsII  
Δs0 
 sII
e2∗t2∗1
e1∗t1∗  1
e1∗t1∗  1
Figure 8: Global optimality of partial-separation: a revealed-preference argument
Recall from Proposition 2 that for all ∆s ≥ ∆sII , the principal implements effort e = 1
under the optimal no-separation contract. Moreover, if s ≥ sII holds in addition, then e = 1
is also implemented under the optimal partial-separation contract (see Proposition 3). In
this case, both contracts are payoff-equivalent, and the principal is indifferent between the
two contracts. Now, consider the white, dotted area in Figure 8, which satisfies s < sII .
There, the induced effort level under the optimal partial-separation contract is less than 1,
even though implementing e = 1 would have been feasible. Hence, by optimality, it follows that
the principal must strictly prefer this partial-separation contract to the optimal no-separation
contract which, recall, is payoff-equivalent to the partial-separation contract that implements
e = 1. Note, however, that the strict optimality of partial-separation contracts does not depend
on the existence of corner solutions as the following result shows.
Proposition 4 (Globally optimal contract) There is a strictly increasing, continuous func-
tion B : s→ s that allows to partition the (s, s)-space into three subsets (see Figure 9):
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(i) For s < B(s), the no-separation contract (Proposition 2) is strictly optimal. In particular,
this is the case when ∆s ≤ ∆t′′ holds. Moreover, for a given ∆s ∈ (∆t′′,∆sII), no-
separation is strictly optimal whenever s is sufficiently large.
(ii) For B(s) < s < sII , the partial-separation contract (Proposition 3) is strictly optimal,
(iii) Otherwise, the principal is indifferent between these two contracts. In particular, this is
the case when both s ≥ sII and ∆s ≥ ∆sII hold.
 
 λ s  
s  
no-separation 
indifference 
partial-separation 
Δs0 
ΔsΔsII  
 sII
Bs  
ΔsΔt′′  
ΔsΔsI  
Figure 9: Globally optimal contracts (Proposition 4)
First, for ∆s ≤ ∆t′′ the no-separation contract is globally optimal because in this parameter
range, the principal’s payoff is given by the first-best social surplus minus the constant U0 (see
(11) and Proposition 2). At the same time, from Proposition 3, the optimal partial-separation
contract has the form (t = 0, t ∈ [t′′, t′′′]) in which case, the principal’s payoff is given by
W (t) − U1(e∗1(t), t) (see (12)), where W (t) is below the first-best social surplus and where
U1(e
∗
1(t), t) ≥ U0 for all t ∈ [t′′, t′′′].24
Second, while no-separation is strictly optimal for ∆s not too large, it becomes less attrac-
tive for the principal as ∆s (and hence the implemented effort) increases. This is due to the
fact that, at the same time, the agent’s rent becomes larger. As a result, for ∆s sufficiently
large, partial-separation becomes optimal for the principal: while foregoing some of the surplus,
this allows the principal to save on the agent’s rent and to free-ride on the (external) effort
24From Definition 1 recall that for t = t
′′
, we have U0 = U1(e
∗
1(t), t), and
∂U1(e
∗
1(t),t)
∂t
= e∗1(t) > 0 for t ∈ [t′′, t′′′].
24
incentives generated by the agent’s endogenous outside option.
5 Discussion
In this section, first, we briefly consider the potential role (and desirability) of non-compete
clauses in restricting the agent’s freedom to leave. Second, to illustrate that our results are
driven by the combination of the agent’s freedom to leave and the endogeneity of his outside
option, we also analyze the case where his ex-post outside option is independent of his effort,
and hence exogenous. Third, we show that the restriction to the class of contracts introduced
in section 2 is without loss of generality. Finally, we relax the assumption that the principal
can commit to the initial contract and allow for renegotiation.
Freedom to leave and non-compete clauses In the model, the agent is free to leave
to pursue his ex-post outside option. In principle, the principal might try to prevent this
through instruments such as non-compete clauses as can be observed, for example, in the
context of employment relationships. However, in practice, courts are often hesitant to enforce
non-compete clauses; worrying that employers might abuse them to prevent employees from
working elsewhere at all. As a result, courts typically allow employees to leave except for cases
where the current employer’s legitimate business interests (e.g., trade secrets) are affected.25
One extreme case in this respect is California, where non-compete clauses are not enforced at
all.26 Such legal practices do find support in our framework in those cases where the agent’s
freedom to leave leads to the first-best surplus.
Freedom to leave and exogenous outside option Now, suppose that the agent’s ex-post
outside option is given by v(e) = λ (and hence independent of e), where, in analogy to above,
0 ≤ λ < s. One possible interpretation of this setting is that the agent’s effort constitutes a
25A prominent example is Mark Papermaster, who (despite of a non-compete clause) moved from IBM to
Apple Inc. (to replace Tony Fadell, “father” of the iPod, as Senior Vice President). While IBM tried to stop the
move, the case was finally settled in 2009: Papermaster was allowed to move with the only condition of having to
testify in court that he would not share IBM business secrets (see e.g., http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/111b3c1c-
aadd-11dd-897c-000077b07658.html and http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2009/01/27papermaster.html).
26For more detailed discussions of non-compete clauses, see e.g., Posner, Triantis, and Triantis (2004) and
Gilson (1999), who, however, do not focus on effort incentives (for an exception, see e.g., Kra¨kel and Sliwka,
2009). The issue of optimal litigation strategies against leaving knowledge workers is analyzed in Gompers and
Lerner (2000) and Hvide and Kristiansen (2012).
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human capital investment that - in contrast to the endogenous outside option case - is fully
specific to the relationship with the principal. It turns out that in the exogenous outside
option case, the resulting effort level and ex-post participation decisions are identical to those
observed in the standard model with full commitment (see e.g., Laffont and Martimort, 2002,
p. 194ff.). To see this, note that in the bad (good) state the agent will leave the principal
ex-post if t < λ (t < λ) holds. Now, suppose that the optimal contract would indeed stipulate
t < λ, in which case the agent would leave, and the payoffs of the agent and principal would
be λ and 0, respectively. However, in this case the principal would be better off by setting
t = λ, while leaving t unchanged: the agent would then face the same effort incentives and
would obtain the same payoff as before. However, the principal would be strictly better off,
because the agent would now stay in the bad state (maintaining our assumption that he does
so when indifferent); yielding the principal an extra payoff of s− λ > 0 in this state. It follows
that under the optimal contract, t ≥ λ and (by an analogous argument) t ≥ λ have to hold.
Put differently (and in contrast to the endogenous outside option case), the optimal contract is
always of the no-separation type. Hence, in line with the standard model, the agent’s optimal
choice of effort level is given by the wage spread ∆t, and the wage spread optimally chosen
by the principal depends on ∆s only. However, as for the respective payments, the principal
cannot set t as low as possible, but has to respect the agent’s ex-post outside option which
leads to t = λ. In contrast to the endogenous outside option case, this implies that the agent
does not earn a rent in state s (i.e., he is indifferent between staying and leaving); making
no-separation more attractive in the exogenous outside option case.27
Proposition 5 (Optimal contract with exogenous outside option) If (i) the agent is
free to leave and (ii) his ex-post outside option is exogenous and given by v(e) = λ, where
0 ≤ λ < s, then the optimal contract is of the no-separation type and satisfies t = λ and
∆t = min(∆s2 , 1). The induced effort level is e = min(
∆s
2 , 1). Moreover, for λ = 0, the
equilibrium outcome is exactly the same as in the standard model with full commitment.
Note that, for λ > 0, compared to the standard model, only the optimal payments go up by λ
in both states of the world. Hence, the main predictions of the standard model are qualitatively
unaffected by the agent’s freedom to leave as long as his outside option is exogenous (i.e., as
27Similar to above, ex-ante participation by both the agent and the principal is always ensured.
26
long as the agent’s effort is fully specific to the relationship with the principal, and hence does
not affect the value of his outside option). In contrast, as shown above, the agent’s freedom to
leave leads to markedly different results if his outside option is endogenous (i.e., if the agent’s
effort has at least some general component that positively affects his outside option).
Contract space Up to now, we have only considered contracts of the form t ∈ T+ ≡ {(t, t) |
t ≥ t ≥ 0} and have argued that this restriction is without loss of generality. We now prove this
claim formally. The revelation principle implies that it suffices to consider a set T of contracts
(τ(ê, ŝ; s), τ0(ê, ŝ)), where (i) ê and ŝ denote messages about e and s, respectively, that the
agent sends after date 3, (ii) for given messages ê and ŝ, τ(ê, ŝ; s) denotes the payment to the
agent if the principal’s realized gross profit is given by s ∈ {s, s}, (iii) for given messages ê and
ŝ, τ0(ê, ŝ) denotes the payment to the agent if the principal’s realized gross profit is zero (which
is the case when the agent leaves), (iv) due to the agent’s limited liability τ(ê, ŝ; s), τ0(ê, ŝ) ≥ 0
holds for all ê, ŝ, s, and (v) the agent’s incentive compatibility condition
max {τ(e, s; s), λe+ τ0(e, s)} ≥ max {τ(ê, ŝ; s), λe+ τ0(ê, ŝ)} (14)
is satisfied for all e, ê ∈ [0, 1] and for all s, ŝ ∈ {s, s}.28 Denote the subset of contracts where
the contractually promised payments do not vary in the agent’s messages (both on and off the
equilibrium path) by T˜ .
Proposition 6 (Restriction to T+ is without loss of generality) For any contract in T ,
there exists a contract in T˜ that leads to the same equilibrium outcome (i.e., effort level, ex-post
participation decisions, and payoffs). Moreover, for any contract in T˜ that either (i) specifies
a strictly positive payment when the gross profit is zero or (ii) specifies a payment when the
gross profit is s that is strictly larger than the payment when the gross profit is s, there exists
a contract in T+ that yields the principal a strictly higher payoff.
Renegotiation We have so far assumed that the principal can commit to the terms of the
initial contract. However, since λ < s < s, whenever she offers a partial-separation contract,
this leads to an inefficient outcome ex-post, such that the parties have an incentive to renego-
28Note that when sending his messages between dates 3 and 4, the agent knows the state, and effort costs are
already sunk, which explains the form of the agent’s incentive compatibility condition.
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tiate.29 Specifically, after effort provision, the principal might be tempted to propose altered
payments that induce participation in all states.30 As this would lead to a larger surplus ex-
post, there always exist new payments that would make both parties better off. When the
principal cannot credibly commit not to renegotiate, without loss of generality, one can restrict
attention to initial contracts that are renegotiation-proof (in the sense of inducing an equilib-
rium outcome that is ex-post pareto-efficient). Clearly, in our framework this is the case when
the initial contract induces the agent to stay in both states or, using our terminology, when it
is of the no-separation type. This observation in combination with Proposition 6 implies that,
when renegotiation cannot be ruled out, without loss of generality one can restrict attention
to no-separation contracts t ∈ T2. In this case, Proposition 2 (which characterizes optimal
no-separation contracts) also characterizes the globally optimal contract. As a result, all of the
properties of this contract type (such as first-best incentives and surplus, or non-responsiveness)
would remain equilibrium features if renegotiation could not be ruled out.
6 Conclusion
We consider a standard moral hazard model with risk-neutrality and limited liability and
modify it in two empirically relevant ways. First, we assume that the agent is free to leave the
principal in the middle of the project (implying that the agent will stay with the principal only
if he has an incentive to do so). Second, we suppose that the agent’s effort is not fully specific
to the relationship with the principal, but also has some positive effect on the agent’s ex-post
outside option, which, hence, is endogenous. Our model captures well the case where agents
are “knowledge workers” in the sense of Drucker (1959), whose human capital and presence is
important for the success of the principal’s project.
These two (apparently small) modifications give rise to a rich set of interesting qualitative
properties of optimal incentive contracts that are in stark contrast to the standard model
with full commitment. For example, the optimal incentive contract may lead to the first-best
29Beginning with Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) and Ma (1991), there is a substantial literature on renegotiation
in static moral hazard problems with a risk-averse agent. In these models, participation by the agent is not
an issue. Rather, while from an ex-ante incentive perspective the agent should bear some risk, from an ex-post
perspective the agent should be fully insured.
30In equilibrium, the principal correctly anticipates the agent’s outside option, and hence may be tempted to
raise the respective payment to match it.
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surplus (and hence eliminate all inefficiencies), it may exhibit non-responsiveness to changes in
underlying parameters, or it might entail inefficient separation. As discussed above, our model
may consequently shed additional light on issues such as the (social) desirability of non-compete
clauses, the apparent incompleteness of contracts, the role of up-or-out rules, or the interplay
of internal and external sources of incentive provision.
As for future research, it would be interesting to investigate in more detail the desirability
of non-compete clauses from both the principal’s and the agent’s perspective as well as from an
efficiency point of view. Also, the case that the agent’s effort provided inside the relationship
with the principal actually harms the agent’s ex-post outside option would be interesting to
study. For example, by tailoring his human capital to the needs of the principal, the agent
might reduce his outside opportunities. Recently, this issue has been investigated by Rasul and
Sonderegger (2010), however, in the context of an adverse selection model where an ex-ante
investment affects some ex-post outside option.
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Appendix
Lemmas 1 and 2 and Propositions 3 and 5 follow immediately from the discussion in the text
and require no separate formal proof.
A Proof of Lemma 3
Ad (i): We prove the claim by showing that (a) for tλ ∈ [0, 1) we have e∗(t) 6= tλ , and (b) for
t
λ ∈ [0, 1) we have e∗(t) 6= tλ . First, suppose tλ ∈ (0, 1). In this case, the set E0(t) = ( tλ , 1] is
non-empty (see Lemma 1), and e = tλ cannot be the agent’s optimal choice of effort because,
on the one hand, U(e, t) is continuous and piece-wise concave and, on the other hand, Lemma
2 (iii) implies
∂U1(
t
λ
,t)
∂e ≥ 0⇒
∂U0(
t
λ
,t)
∂e > 0 (that is, together these observations imply that there
exist effort levels slightly smaller or larger than tλ that yield the agent a strictly larger payoff).
Second, suppose tλ ∈ (0, 1). In this case, the set E1(t) = ( tλ ,min( tλ , 1)] is non-empty (see
Lemma 1). Moreover, Lemma 2 (iii) implies
∂U2(
t
λ
,t)
∂e ≥ 0 ⇒
∂U1(
t
λ
,t)
∂e > 0. On the one hand,
if both tλ ∈ (0, 1) and t 6= t hold, similar to above, these considerations in combination with
the continuity and piece-wise concavity of U(e, t) imply that e = tλ cannot be the agent’s
optimal choice of effort. On the other hand, if both tλ ∈ (0, 1) and t = t hold, we have
E1(t) = (
t
λ ,
t
λ ] = ∅ and E0(t) = (
t
λ , 1] 6= ∅. Moreover, in this case it follows from (5) that
∂U2(
t
λ
,t)
∂e = − tλ < − tλ + λ =
∂U0(
t
λ
,t)
∂e . Hence, again similar to above, the continuity and piece-
wise concavity of U(e, t) imply that e = tλ cannot be the agent’s optimal choice of effort.
Finally, suppose tλ = 0 (
t
λ = 0), in which case it follows that e
∗(t) 6= tλ (e∗(t) 6= tλ) because
∂U1(0,t)
∂e ,
∂U0(0,t)
∂e > 0 holds for all t ∈ T+.
Ad (ii): In a first step, suppose that, for a given t ∈ T+, we have e∗(t) ∈ E2(t), where, by
definition, E2(t) = [0,min(
t
λ , 1)]. The discussion in the proof of Lemma 3 (i) above implies
that in this case it must hold that tλ > 0. On the one hand, if
t
λ < 1, then the concavity
of U2(e, t) in combination with e
∗(t) 6= tλ (see the proof of Lemma 3 (i) above) immediately
implies that e∗(t) = e∗2(t) ≡ ∆t < tλ has to hold. On the other hand, if tλ ≥ 1, then the
concavity of U2(e, t) in combination with E2(t) = [0, 1] implies e
∗(t) = min(e∗2(t), 1). Hence, to
summarize e∗(t) ∈ E2(t) implies e∗(t) = min(e∗2(t), 1). In a second step, following analogous
lines of reasoning, it is straightforward to show that e∗(t) ∈ E1(t) implies e∗(t) = min(e∗1(t), 1)
and that e∗(t) ∈ E0(t) implies e∗(t) = min(e∗0(t), 1), which concludes the proof of the Lemma.
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B Proof of Proposition 1
For given t ∈ T+, we first characterize whether e∗(t) ∈ E2(t), e∗(t) ∈ E1(t), or e∗(t) ∈ E0(t)
holds (i.e., we characterize which equilibrium ex-post participation decisions emerge for a given
contract), and, subsequently, we employ Lemma 3 to characterize e∗(t). We proceed in six
steps.
Step 1. By using basic properties of the agent’s payoff function (see Lemma 2), one
can show that, for some contracts t, some ex-post participation decisions cannot emerge in
equilibrium. Put differently, in the following we show that in some regions of the contract space
T+ it cannot be optimal for the agent to choose his effort from certain regions of the effort
space. To this end, define two functions f(t) ≡ λ1+λ ·t and g(t) ≡ λ
2
1+2λ+
λ
1+2λ ·t, and a threshold
value h ≡ λ21+λ (see Figure 10, which depicts the lines f , g, and h in the contract space). The
following lemma (which is proven at the end of this section) will be useful.
Lemma 4 Suppose t ∈ T+. Then
(i) e∗(t) /∈ E1(t) if either t ≤ h or g(t) ≤ t < λ holds, and
(ii) e∗(t) /∈ E2(t) if both t ≤ f(t) and t < λ hold.
 
0 t  
t  
gt
ft 
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e*(t) ∉ E2(t) 
e*(t) ∉ E1(t)
Δt=0 
t′′′
Figure 10: Illustration of Lemma 4
Lemma 4 in combination with Lemma 2 pins down the equilibrium ex-post participation
decisions of the agent for large parts of the contract space. This is illustrated by Figure 11
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Figure 11: Only in the set T̂ of contracts (the non-shaded, white part of T+) Lemma 4 in com-
bination with Lemma 2 does not yet uniquely pin down the equilibrium ex-post participation
decisions (for ease of exposition, the dependency of Ej(t) on t, for j = {0, 1, 2}, is suppressed).
that combines the information contained in Figures 3 and 10. In particular, Figure 11 depicts
the candidate effort intervals in which the agent’s optimal effort e∗(t) may be located for a
given t. For example, consider the grey-shaded area of Figure 11. In this region of the contract
space, Lemma 2 implies E2(t) = [0,
t
λ ], E1(t) = (
t
λ , 1], and E0(t) = ∅, and Lemma 4 implies
e∗(t) /∈ E2(t); implying that in the grey-shaded area it must be the case that e∗(t) ∈ E1(t).
Only in the non-shaded, white parts of Figure 11, Lemma 4 in combination with Lemma 2
does not yet pin down the equilibrium participation decisions (i.e., the respective set Ej(t) in
which e∗(t) is located). Formally, this subset of contracts is defined as T̂ ≡ {(t, t) ∈ T+ such
that either (i) t ∈ [0, h] and t > f(t), or (ii) t ∈ (h, λ), or (iii) t ∈ [λ, t′′′) and g(t) > t > f(t)}.
Step 2. We now restrict attention to the set of contracts T̂ (see Step 1 above). Given
t ∈ T̂ , for each non-empty effort interval Ej(t) for which e∗(t) ∈ Ej(t) has not been ruled out
by Lemma 4 (see Figure 11), we now characterize the effort level that is (locally) optimal in
Ej(t). This will allow us to pin down the maximum payoff the agent may obtain in each of the
relevant intervals Ej(t).
Lemma 5 Suppose t ∈ T̂ .
(i) If t > f(t) holds, the effort level that is optimal in the set E2(t) is given by e
∗
2(t). In this
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case, e∗2(t) ∈ [0, 1).
(ii) If both t > h and t < g(t) hold, the effort level that is optimal in the set E1(t) is given by
e∗1(t). In this case, e∗1(t) ∈ (0, 1).
(iii) The effort level that is optimal in the set E0(t) is given by (a) e = 1 if both λ ≥ 1 and
t < λ hold, and (b) e = λ if both λ < 1 and t < λ2 hold. If both λ < 1 and λ2 ≤ t < λ
hold, we have e∗(t) /∈ E0(t).
Lemma 5 (which is proven at the end of this section) allows to characterize the boundaries
between the sets T0, T1, and T2, where these boundaries will be located in T̂ . For further
reference, note that (5) in combination with the Envelope-Theorem implies
∂U2(e
∗
2(t), t)
∂t
= e∗2(t),
∂U2(e
∗
2(t), t)
∂t
= 1− e∗2(t),
∂U1(e
∗
1(t), t)
∂t
= e∗1(t), and
∂U1(e
∗
1(t), t)
∂t
= 0
(15)
for e∗2(t), e∗1(t) ∈ (0, 1).
Step 3. Next, we identify contracts t ∈ T̂ that make the agent indifferent between choosing
some effort level from the set E0(t) or choosing some effort level from the set E1(t) (which may,
in principle, exist if both t ∈ (h, λ) and t < g(t) hold (see Lemmas 2 and 4 and Figure 11)).
If such contracts exist, the above observations in combination with Lemma 5 imply that such
contracts are implicitly defined by U1(e
∗
1(t), t) = U0, where
U1(e
∗
1(t), t) = U0 ⇔ e∗1(t)t+ (1− e∗1(t))λe∗1(t)−
1
2
(e∗1(t))
2 = U0
⇔ (t+ λ)
2
1 + 2λ
− 1 + 2λ
2
(t+ λ)2
1 + 2λ
= U0 ⇔ (t+ λ)
2
2(1 + 2λ)
= U0
⇔ t = t′′ ≡
√
2(1 + 2λ)U0 − λ, (16)
and where it is straightforward to show that (a) t
′′ ∈ (U0, λ) if λ ≥ 1 and (b) t′′ ∈ (U0, λ2) if
λ < 1. To summarize, in the set T̂ there indeed exist contracts where the agent is indifferent
between choosing an effort level min(λ, 1) ∈ E0(t) and choosing an effort level e∗1(t) ∈ E1(t).
More precisely, the above observations imply that in the set of contracts {t ∈ T̂ such that
t ∈ (h, λ) and t < g(t)}, the agent prefers min(λ, 1) ∈ E0(t) over e∗1(t) ∈ E1(t) if t < t′′ holds,
while he prefers e∗1(t) ∈ E1(t) over min(λ, 1) ∈ E0(t) if t ≥ t′′ holds.
Step 4. We now identify contracts t ∈ T̂ that make the agent indifferent between choosing
some effort level from the set E2(t) or choosing some effort level from the set E1(t) (which
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may, in principle, exist if both g(t) > t > f(t) and t ∈ (h, t′′′) hold (see Lemmas 2 and 4
and Figure 11). If such contracts exist, then, in analogy to above, Lemma 5 (i) and (ii) imply
that they are located on the graph of a function y(t) : t → t that is implicitly defined by
U2(e
∗
2(t), t) = U1(e
∗
1(t), t). Moreover, for all contracts t on the graph of y(t), it holds that (a)
e∗1(t) =
t+λ
2λ+1 ∈ (0, 1) (see Lemma 5(ii)), and (b) 0 ≤ e∗2(t) = ∆t < e∗1(t) which follows from
e∗2(t) ∈ E2(t) = [0, tλ ], e∗1(t) ∈ E1(t) = ( tλ ,min( tλ , 1)], and U
′
2(
t
λ , t) < U
′
1(
t
λ , t) (see Lemma 2
(iii)). Note that U2(e
∗
2(t), t) = U1(e
∗
1(t), t), the Implicit-Function Theorem, (15), and the above
observations with respect to e∗2(t) and e∗1(t) imply
∂y(t)
∂t
=
e∗1(t)− e∗2(t)
1− e∗2(t)
∈ (0, 1), and (17)
∂2y(t)
∂t
2 < 0⇔ (1− e∗2(t)) · (
1
1 + 2λ
− 1) + (e∗1(t)− e∗2(t)) < 0⇔
t− λ
(1− e∗2(t))2(1 + 2λ)
< 0, (18)
which is satisfied, because for all t ∈ T̂ we have t < λ (see Figure 11). Moreover, note that
U2(e
∗
2(t), t) = U1(e
∗
1(t), t) is satisfied at t = (t = t
′′′ ≡ 1 + λ, t = λ). That is, limt→t′′′y(t) = λ.
Also, for all t ∈ (h, t′′′) we have y(t) ∈ (f(t), g(t)), which follows from the following Interme-
diate Value Theorem argument. Take some arbitrary t ∈ (h, t′′′) as given. First, suppose that,
at the same time, t ≤ f(t) holds. In this case, the proof of Lemma 4 (ii) implies that, given
such a contract, the agent obtains a strictly higher payoff from choosing some effort level in
E1(t) than from choosing any effort level in E2(t). Second, suppose that t ≥ g(t) holds. In this
case, the proof of Lemma 4 (i) implies that, given such a contract, the agent obtains a strictly
higher payoff from choosing some effort level in E2(t) than from choosing any effort level in
E1(t). These observations, the Intermediate Value Theorem, and the fact that U1(e
∗
1(t), t) is
independent of t while U2(e
∗
2(t), t) is increasing in t imply the claim.
To summarize, the above discussion shows that in the set T̂ there indeed exist contracts
where the agent is indifferent between choosing an effort level e∗2(t) ∈ E2(t) and choosing
an effort level e∗1(t) ∈ E1(t). More precisely, the above observations imply that in the set
of contracts {t ∈ T̂ such that g(t) > t > f(t) and t ∈ (h, t′′′ = 1 + λ)}, the agent prefers
e∗2(t) ∈ E2(t) over e∗1(t) ∈ E1(t) if t ≥ y(t) holds, while he prefers e∗1(t) ∈ E1(t) over e∗2(t) ∈ E2(t)
if t < y(t) holds.
Step 5. Now, we identify contracts t ∈ T̂ that make the agent indifferent between choosing
some effort level from the set E2(t) or choosing some effort level from the set E0(t) (which may,
in principle, exist if both t > f(t) and t < λ hold (see Lemmas 2 (i) and 4 and Figure 11)). If
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such contracts exist, then, in analogy to above, Lemma 5 (i) and (iii) imply that they are located
on the graph of a function x(t) : t→ t that is implicitly defined by U2(e∗2(t), t) = U0. Moreover,
for all contracts t on the graph of x(t), it holds that (a) e∗2(t) = ∆t < 1 (see Lemma 5 (i)), and
(b) e∗2(t) = 0 if and only if ∆t = 0. Hence, the fact that U2(e∗2(t), t) = U0 in combination with
the Implicit Function Theorem, (15), and the above observations with respect to e∗2(t) imply
∂x(t)
∂t
= − e
∗
2(t)
1− e∗2(t)
< 0 ( = 0) for e∗2(t) > 0 (e
∗
2(t) = 0), and (19)
∂2x(t)
∂t
2 = −
1
[1− e∗2(t)]2
< 0. (20)
Moreover, note that U2(e
∗
2(t), t) = U0 is satisfied at t = (t = t
′ ≡ U0, t = U0). That is, x(U0) =
U0, and recall from Step 3 that U0 < t
′′
holds. Also, recall from Step 4 that y(t) ∈ (f(t), g(t))
for all t ∈ (h, t′′′), which implies y(t′′) ∈ (f(t′′), g(t′′)) (for the definition of t′′ see (16)). Hence,
for the contract t˜ ≡ (t = y(t′′), t = t′′) it holds that U2(e∗2(t˜), t˜) = U1(e∗1(t˜), t˜) = U0 (because
contract t˜ is located on the graph of y(t) and t = t
′′
holds), which implies x(t
′′
) = y(t
′′
).
To summarize, in the set T̂ there indeed exist contracts where the agent is indifferent
between choosing an effort level e∗2(t) ∈ E2(t) and an effort level min(λ, 1) ∈ E0(t). More
precisely, the above observations imply that in the set of contracts {t ∈ T̂ such that t > f(t)
and t < t
′′}, the agent prefers min(λ, 1) ∈ E0(t) over e∗2(t) ∈ E2(t) if either (i) t < U0 or (ii)
t ∈ [U0, t′′] and t < x(t) holds, while the agent prefers e∗2(t) ∈ E2(t) over min(λ, 1) ∈ E0(t)
otherwise.
Step 6. Taken together, Steps 1 through 5 imply the definitions of the sets T0, T1, and T2 in
Proposition 1 because for t ∈ [t′, t′′] we have b(t) = x(t), while for t ∈ [t′′, t′′′) we have b(t) = y(t)
(see Definition 1). That is, for j = 0, 1, 2, we have shown that t ∈ Tj ⇒ e∗(t) ∈ Ej(t), which
in combination with Lemma 3(ii) implies e∗(t) = min(e∗j (t), 1). Finally, the properties of b(t)
as stated in Proposition 1 immediately follow from the discussion of the properties of x(t) and
y(t) above, which concludes the proof.
B.1 Proof of Lemma 4
Note that h = λ
2
1+λ < λ, g(h) = h, g(t
′′′
) = λ, f(0) = 0 and f(t
′′′
) = λ, which implies that the
lines h, g(t), and f(t) are located exactly as depicted in Figure 10.
Ad (i): First, suppose t ≤ h, which is equivalent to ∂U1(
t
λ
,t)
∂e ≥ 0 (see (5)). This observation
in combination with the concavity of U1(e, t) implies that U1(e, t) is increasing in e for all
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e ∈ E1(t). Moreover, recall that h < λ, and hence tλ < 1; implying E0(t) = ( tλ , 1] 6= ∅ (see
Lemma 1). These observations in combination with Lemma 2 imply that there exists some
effort level in E0(t) that yields the agent a strictly higher payoff than any effort level in E1(t),
and hence e∗(t) /∈ E1(t). Note that in the case t = 0 we have E1(t) = ∅. Second, suppose
g(t) ≤ t < λ, in which case E1(t) = ( tλ ,min( tλ , 1)] 6= ∅ (which follows from tλ < 1) and
∂U1(
t
λ
,t)
∂e ≤ 0 (which is equivalent to g(t) ≤ t). These observations in combination with the
concavity of U1(e, t) imply that U1(e, t) is decreasing in e for all e ∈ E1(t). Consequently, it
follows from Lemma 2 and the fact that E2(t) 6= ∅ ∀t ∈ T+ that there exists some effort level
in E2(t) that yields the agent a strictly higher payoff than any effort level in E1(t), and hence
e∗(t) /∈ E1(t).
Ad (ii): Note that E2(t) = [0,
t
λ ] (which follows from t < λ) and E1(t) = (
t
λ ,min(
t
λ , 1)],
where E1(t) 6= ∅ unless t = t = 0 (see Lemmas 1 and 2). However, if t = t = 0, it follows from
∂U1(0,t)
∂e ,
∂U0(0,t)
∂e > 0 ∀t ∈ T+ that e∗(t) /∈ E2(t). Hence, in the following suppose t > 0. Note
that
∂U2(
t
λ
,t)
∂e ≥ 0 (which is equivalent to t ≤ f(t)), which in combination with the concavity of
U2(e, t) implies that U2(e, t) is increasing in e for all e ∈ E2(t). Consequently, it follows from
Lemma 2(iii) that there exists some effort level in E1(t) that yields the agent a strictly higher
payoff than any effort level in E2(t), and hence e
∗(t) /∈ E2(t).
B.2 Proof of Lemma 5
Ad (i): From (5) we have
∂U2(
t
λ
,t)
∂e < 0 for all t > f(t), where, for all t ∈ T̂ , we have tλ < 1.
These observations in combination with the concavity of U2(e, t) and
∂U2(0,t)
∂e ≥ 0 imply that
the effort level that is optimal in E2(t) = [0,
t
λ ] is defined by the respective first-order condition,
and hence is given by e∗2(t) = ∆t, where e∗2(t) ∈ [0, tλ) holds.
Ad (ii): Using Lemma 2 it can be shown that
∂U1(
t
λ
,t)
∂e > 0 >
∂U1(
t
λ
,t)
∂e for all t ∈ T̂ satisfying
t > h and t < g(t), where we have tλ < 1. These observations in combination with the concavity
of U1(e, t) imply that the effort level that is optimal in E1(t) = (
t
λ ,min(
t
λ , 1)] is defined by the
respective first-order condition, and hence is given by e∗1(t) =
t+λ
2λ+1 if
t+λ
2λ+1 ≤ 1 holds. This is
indeed the case because for all t ∈ T̂ we have t < 1 + λ, and hence t+λ2λ+1 < 1.
Ad (iii): First, suppose that both λ ≥ 1 and t < λ hold. In this case, we have tλ < 1
and ∂U0(1,t)∂e = λ − 1 ≥ 0 (see (5)). These observations in combination with the concavity
of U0(e, t) imply that the effort level that is optimal in E0(t) = (
t
λ , 1] is given by 1, which
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proves part (a). Second, suppose that λ < 1 holds. Recall that t < λ implies tλ < 1, and
hence E0(t) = (
t
λ , 1] 6= ∅. Note that
∂U0(
t
λ
,t)
∂e >
∂U1(
t
λ
,t)
∂e for t > 0 and
∂U0(
t
λ
,t)
∂e =
∂U1(
t
λ
,t)
∂e for
t = 0 (see Lemma 2). Moreover, from (5), we have 0 ≥ ∂U0(
t
λ
,t)
∂e if t ≥ λ2. Hence, for t ≥ λ2
we have e∗(t) /∈ E0(t), which proves part (c). With respect to part (b), note that we have
h < λ2 < λ < 1. Moreover, from (5) we have
∂U0(
t
λ
,t)
∂e > 0 >
∂U0(1,t)
∂e for t < λ
2. Hence, for
t < λ2, these observations in combination with the concavity of U0(e, t) imply that the effort
level that is optimal in E0(t) = (
t
λ , 1] is defined by the respective first-order condition, and
hence it is given by λ, which proves part (b).
C Proof of Proposition 2
The discussion above the Proposition immediately implies that the principal’s problem of max-
imizing (9) can be transformed in a one-dimensional problem of the following form:
max
∆t∈[0,1]
{∆t · (∆s−∆t) + s− t(∆t)} , (21)
where, for a given ∆t, the payment in the bad state t(∆t) has to be such that the contract
(t = t(∆t), t = ∆t+ t(∆t)) is on the graph of b(t).
Ad (i): Part (i) immediately follows from (9) in combination with the discussion above the
Proposition.
Ad (ii): In a first step towards solving (21), we now derive the functional form of t(∆t).
First, it follows from Definition 1 that, for t ∈ [t′, t′′], on the graph of b(t) it holds that
1
2(∆t)
2 + t = t
′
. Hence, t(∆t) = t
′ − 12(∆t)2 for ∆t ∈ [0,∆t′′], where ∆t′′ ≡ t
′′ − b(t′′) < 1.
Second, it follows from Definition 1 that, for t ∈ [t′′, t′′′], on the graph of b(t) it holds that
1
2
(∆t)2 + t =
(t+ λ)2
2(1 + 2λ)
⇔ 0 = t2 − t · [2λ+ 2− 2∆t] + [2λ∆t+ λ2 − 2λ(∆t)2] , (22)
where the equivalence follows from the identity t = ∆t + t and rearranging terms. Note that
(22) is a quadratic equation in t. This quadratic equation has two solutions, only one of which
is, however, admissible because for all contracts on the graph of b(t) it holds that t ≤ λ.
Hence,
t(∆t) =
{
t
′ − 12(∆t)2 if ∆t ∈ [0,∆t′′], and[
λ− (√1 + 2λ− 1)]+ ∆t · [√1 + 2λ− 1] if ∆t ∈ [∆t′′, 1]. (23)
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To solve (21), we now proceed in three steps. First, we derive the optimal ∆t in the
interval [0,∆t′′]. Second, we derive the optimal ∆t in the interval [∆t′′, 1]. Note that (21) in
combination with (23) implies that both in the interval [0,∆t′′] and the interval [∆t′′, 1] the
principal’s objective function is strictly concave in ∆t. Third, building on these preliminary
results we characterize the optimal ∆t as a function of ∆s.
Step 1. (21) and (23) imply that in the interval [0,∆t′′] the first-order condition of (21)
with respect to ∆t is satisfied at ∆t = ∆s. Hence, in the interval [0,∆t′′] the optimal ∆t is
given by
∆t =
{
∆s if ∆s < ∆t′′, and
∆t′′ if ∆s ≥ ∆t′′. (24)
Recall that ∆t′′ < 1.
Step 2. (21) and (23) imply that in the interval [∆t′′, 1] the first-order condition of (21)
with respect to ∆t is satisfied at ∆t = ∆s−
√
1+2λ+1
2 . Hence, in the interval [∆t
′′, 1] the optimal
∆t is given by
∆t =
{
∆t′′ if ∆s ≤ ∆sI , and
min{∆s−
√
1+2λ+1
2 , 1} if ∆s > ∆sI ,
(25)
where ∆sI ≡ 2∆t′′ +
√
1 + 2λ − 1 and where ∆s > ∆sI ⇔ ∆s−
√
1+2λ+1
2 > ∆t
′′. Importantly,
note that ∆t′′ < ∆sI = 2∆t′′ +
√
1 + 2λ− 1.
Step 3. We can now use the preliminary results obtained in Steps 1 and 2 to characterize
the effort level that the principal wants to induce for a given ∆s.31 First, consider ∆s ∈ (0,∆t′′).
For such ∆s, ∆t = ∆s < ∆t′′ is optimal in the interval [0,∆t′′] (see (24)), while ∆t = ∆t′′
is optimal in the interval [∆t′′, 1] (see (25)). As ∆t = ∆t′′ would also have been feasible in
the interval [0,∆t′′], ∆t = ∆s must be globally optimal (i.e., in the interval ∆s ∈ (0,∆t′′) the
principal optimally induces ∆t = ∆s). Second, consider ∆s ∈ [∆t′′,∆sI ]. For such ∆s, both
in the interval [0,∆t′′] and the interval [∆t′′, 1] the optimal ∆t is given by ∆t′′ (see (24) and
(25)), and hence, for all ∆s ∈ (0,∆sI ], the optimal ∆t is given by ∆t′′. To summarize, for ∆s ∈
(0,∆sI ], the principal induces ∆t = min{∆s,∆t′′}. Finally, consider ∆s ∈ (∆sI ,∞). For such
∆s, ∆t = ∆t′′ is optimal in the interval [0,∆t′′] (see (24)), while ∆t = min{∆s−
√
1+2λ+1
2 , 1} >
∆t′′ is optimal in the interval [∆t′′, 1] (see (25)). As ∆t = ∆t′′ would also have been feasible in
31Intuitively, we now show the following: whenever the optimal ∆t in the interval [0,∆t′′] (in the interval
[∆t′′, 1]) is in the interior of this interval, the optimal ∆t in the interval [∆t′′, 1] (in the interval [0,∆t′′]) is equal
to ∆t′′. As ∆t′′ is an element of both intervals, this implies that whenever the ∆t that is optimal in one of the
two subsets is interior it is also globally optimal in the entire interval [0, 1].
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the interval [∆t′′, 1], ∆t = min{∆s−
√
1+2λ+1
2 , 1} must be globally optimal (i.e., in the interval
∆s ∈ (∆sI ,∞) the principal optimally induces ∆t = min{∆s−
√
1+2λ+1
2 , 1}), which concludes
the proof.
D Proof of Proposition 4
In the following, we characterize the globally optimal contract across the (s, s)-space. At the
end of the proof, we show that contracts t ∈ T0 can never be optimal. Consequently, for given
(s, s), we now determine whether the globally optimal contract is given (a) by the optimal
no-separation contract as characterized in Proposition 2 (which we denote by t∗2(s, s)) or (b)
by the optimal partial-separation contract as characterized in Proposition 3 (which we denote
by t∗1(s, s)). Define (see (9)):
D(s, s) = Π(t∗1(s, s))−Π(t∗2(s, s)), (26)
and hence contract t∗1(s, s) is globally optimal when D(s, s) ≥ 0 holds, while contract t∗2(s, s)
is globally optimal when D(s, s) ≤ 0 holds. Note that D(s, s) is continuous in s and s. In the
following, we characterize D(s, s) across the (s, s)-space. To do so, we proceed in six steps (for
an illustration, see Figure 12).
λ s  
s  
ΔsΔsII  
Δs0 
 sII
ss  Bs  
ΔsΔt′′  
ΔsΔsI  
sII − Δt ′′
sII − ΔsII
  ΔsII
Figure 12: Illustration of the proof of Proposition 4
Step 1. Suppose that both s < sII and ∆s ≥ ∆sII hold. This parameter region is non-
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empty because it can be shown that ∆sII + λ < sII holds (see Figure 12). The discussion
above Proposition 4 implies:
Lemma 6 D(s, s) > 0 if both s < sII and ∆s ≥ ∆sII hold (where pairs (s, s) satisfying these
conditions indeed exist).
Step 2. Now, suppose that s ≥ sII holds. In this region, Proposition 3 implies t∗1(s, s) =
(t = 0, t = t
′′′
), which would lead the agent to choose an effort level of 1; implying that s
would obtain with certainty. Two cases with respect to t∗2(s, s) may arise. First, if ∆s ≥ ∆sII ,
then under the optimal no-separation contract exactly the same outcome as under t∗1(s, s)
would obtain (see Proposition 2(ii)): the agent would exert an effort level of 1, s would obtain
with certainty, and the principal’s payoff would be identical to the payoff under the optimal
partial-separation contract because under both contracts the payment by the principal in the
good state would be given by t
′′′
. Hence, in the parameter region where both s ≥ sII and
∆s ≥ ∆sII hold, the principal is indifferent between t∗1(s, s) and t∗2(s, s). Second, if, however,
∆s < ∆sII holds, then the contract t
∗
2(s, s) is strictly optimal, which follows from the following
“revealed preference”-argument. In this parameter region, the principal could have chosen the
contract (t = b(t
′′′
), t = t
′′′
) ∈ T2, which would have yielded her the same payoff as the contract
t∗1(s, s) = (t = 0, t = t
′′′
). The fact that the principal chooses some different contract t∗2(s, s)
(see Proposition 2) implies that, by doing so, she obtains a strictly higher payoff. To summarize
(for an illustration, see again Figure 12):
Lemma 7 D(s, s) = 0 if both s ≥ sII and ∆s ≥ ∆sII hold, and D(s, s) < 0 if both s ≥ sII
and ∆s < ∆sII hold.
Step 3. Now, suppose that both s ≤ sII and ∆s ≤ ∆t′′ hold. In this region, it will
turn out that D(s, s) < 0 holds. To see this, note that, for ∆s ≤ ∆t′′, the contract t∗2(s, s)
implies first-best effort and the equilibrium payoff of the agent is equal to t
′
(see Proposition
2 and Definition 1). We now show that, given the contract t∗1(s, s), the principal’s payoff
would be strictly smaller, which implies the claim. First, note that if s ∈ (sI , sII ], then, given
t∗1(s, s), the agent’s equilibrium payoff is given by
(s+λ)2
8(1+2λ) , which is strictly increasing in s, and
(sI+λ)
2
8(1+2λ) = t
′
. Hence, for all s ∈ (sI , sII ], compared to t∗2(s, s), the contract t∗1(s, s) implies a
higher equilibrium payoff for the agent (but cannot imply a higher social surplus as t∗2(s, s)
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induces first-best effort). Hence, t∗2(s, s) is strictly optimal from the principal’s perspective.
Second, if s ≤ sI holds, the contract t∗2(s, s) is strictly optimal for the following reasons.
While t∗2(s, s) induces first-best effort e∗2(t∗2(s, s)), contract t∗1(s, s) induces a strictly larger
effort level e∗1(t∗1(s, s)) because e∗2(t∗2(s, s)) ≤ e∗2(t′′, t′′) < e∗1(t′′, t′′) = e∗1(t∗1(s, s)) holds: the
first inequality follows from Proposition 2 because we currently consider a range of parameters
where ∆s ≤ ∆t′′ = t′′ − t′′ holds. The second inequality holds because (i) t′′ < λ implies
E2(t
′′, t′′) = [0, t
′′
λ ] and E1(t
′′, t′′) = ( t
′′
λ ,
t
′′
λ ] (see Lemma 2), and (ii) we have e
∗
2(t
′′, t′′) ∈
E2(t
′′, t′′) and e∗1(t′′, t
′′
) ∈ E1(t′′, t′′) (see Proposition 1). The equality e∗1(t′′, t′′) = e∗1(t∗1(s, s))
follows from t∗1(s, s) = (0, t
′′
) for all s ≤ sI . Hence, t∗1(s, s) generates a lower social surplus
than t∗2(s, s); implying a lower profit for the principal because both contracts yield the agent
the same equilibrium payoff of t
′
. To summarize:
Lemma 8 D(s, s) < 0 if both s ≤ sII and ∆s ≤ ∆t′′ hold.
Step 4. To characterize D(s, s) in the remaining parts of the parameter space, it will turn
out to be useful to establish some properties of the partial derivative of D(s, s) with respect to
s. In particular, (26), (9), and Propositions 1-3 imply
∂D(s, s)
∂s
= e∗1(t
∗
1(s, s))− e∗2(t∗2(s, s)), (27)
where obtaining (27) is straightforward because either (a) the optimal contract is derived from
the respective first-order condition (in which case the Envelope Theorem applies), or (b) the
optimal contract is a corner solution (and hence invariant in s). The proof of the following
lemma can be found at the end of this Section.
Lemma 9 Suppose ∆s < ∆sII holds. For any given s, there exists a threshold level s˜(s) such
that
∂D(s, s)
∂s
> 0 if s < s˜(s), and
∂D(s, s)
∂s
≤ 0 if s ≥ s˜(s).
where (i) if s ≥ sII − ∆sII , we have s˜(s) = s + ∆sII , and (ii) if s ≤ sII − ∆sII , we have
that s˜(s) is a strictly increasing function of s that satisfies s˜(s = λ) < λ + ∆sII and s˜(s =
sII −∆sII) = sII .
Now, consider the parameter region where s ≤ sII , ∆s ∈ (∆t′′,∆sII), and s ∈ (sII −
∆sII , sII − ∆t′′) hold (for an illustration, see again Figure 12). In this case, D(s, s) < 0
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because, for given s, Lemma 7 implies D(s, sII) < 0, while Lemma 9 implies
∂D(s,s)
∂s > 0 for all
s ≤ sII .
Lemma 10 D(s, s) < 0 if s ≤ sII , ∆s ∈ (∆t′′,∆sII), and s ∈ (sII −∆sII , sII −∆t′′) hold.
Step 5. To characterize D(s, s) in the remainder of the parameter space, suppose for a
moment that s ≤ sII −∆sII holds. In this case, (i) D(s, s) < 0 if ∆s ≤ ∆t′′ (Lemma 8), (ii)
D(s, s) > 0 if both ∆s ≥ ∆sII and s < sII (Lemma 6), and (iii) D(s, s) = 0 if s ≥ sII (Lemma
7). These observations in combination with Lemma 9 imply that for any s ≤ sII −∆sII there
exists a unique threshold value B(s) such that (a) D(s, s) < 0 holds for all s < B(s), and (b)
D(s, s) ≥ 0 holds for all s ≥ B(s). The above observations also imply that, for s < sII −∆sII ,
the boundary function B(s) is located in a part of the parameter space where ∆s ∈ (∆t′′,∆sII)
and ∂D(s,s)∂s > 0 hold; implying that B(s) < s˜(s) for all s < sII − ∆sII .32 With respect to
its slope, note that B(s) is implicitly defined by D(s, s) = 0. Hence, the Implicit Function
Theorem implies
∂B(s)
∂s
= −
∂D(s,s)
∂s
∂D(s,s)
∂s
> 0 for s < sII −∆sII . (28)
The inequality in (28) follows from (a) ∂D(s,s)∂s > 0 (see the reasoning above) and (b)
∂D(s, s)
∂s
= − (1− e∗2(t∗2(s, s))) < 0, (29)
where this partial derivative can be derived in a similar way as (27), and where the inequality
in (29) follows from e∗2(t∗2(s, s)) < 1 for all ∆s < ∆sII (see Proposition 2, and recall the above
reasoning that, for s < sII − ∆sII , the boundary B(s) is located in a part of the parameter
space where ∆s ∈ (∆t′′,∆sII) holds).
Step 6. To summarize, Lemmas 6-10 and Step 5 imply that the claims in Proposition 4
hold true. In particular, the continuous boundary function B(s) has the following properties:
(a) if s ≥ sII −∆sII , we have B(s) = s+ ∆sII , and (b) if s < sII −∆sII , then B(s) is strictly
increasing in s and it is located in a part of the parameter space where ∆s ∈ (∆t′′,∆sII) holds.
It only remains to show that contracts t ∈ T0 can never be optimal. To see this, note that
any contract t ∈ T0 induces the agent to leave in both states (resulting in a payoff of zero for
the principal). Moreover, note that the contract (t
′
, t
′
) ∈ T2 would yield the principal a payoff
32Note that for s = sII −∆sII , we have B(s) = sII .
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of s−U0 (because ∆t = 0 implies e∗(t) = 0 and t′ = U0 holds (see Proposition 1 and Definition
1)), where s−U0 > s− λ > 0 (which follows from (5) and our assumption that λ < s). Hence,
for all (s, s), there exists some no-separation contract (for example, the one discussed above)
that yields the principal a strictly positive payoff, which implies that choosing some t ∈ T0 can
never be optimal from the principal’s perspective.
D.1 Proof of Lemma 9
It follows from (27) that the sign of ∂D(s,s)∂s depends on the sign of [e
∗
1(t
∗
1(s, s))− e∗2(t∗2(s, s))],
which we study in the following. We proceed in two steps.
Step 1. Consider the range of parameters where ∆s ≤ ∆sI is satisfied, where it will
turn out that e∗2(t∗2(s, s)) < e∗1(t∗1(s, s)) holds. To see this, consider the contract (t′′, t
′′
), where
t′′ ≡ t′′−∆t′′ (for an illustration, see Figure 5). Under this contract, it follows from Definition 1
and Proposition 1 that the agent is indifferent between choosing any of the effort levels e∗2(t′′, t
′′
),
e∗1(t′′, t
′′
), and min(λ, 1), where e
′′
2 ≡ e∗2(t′′, t′′) < e∗1(t′′, t′′) ≡ e
′′
1 (because (i) t
′′
< λ implies
E2(t
′′, t′′) = [0, t
′′
λ ] and E1(t
′′, t′′) = ( t
′′
λ ,
t
′′
λ ] (see Lemma 2), and (ii) we have e
′′
2 ∈ E2(t′′, t′′)
and e
′′
1 ∈ E1(t′′, t′′) (see Proposition 1). Now, note that Proposition 3 implies e
′′
1 ≤ e∗1(t∗1(s, s)).
Moreover, from Proposition 2 it follows that for ∆s ≤ ∆sI we have e∗2(t∗2(s, s)) ≤ e
′′
2 , which
together with the previous observations implies e∗2(t∗2(s, s)) ≤ e
′′
2 < e
′′
1 ≤ e∗1(t∗1(s, s)), which
proves the claim e∗2(t∗2(s, s)) < e∗1(t∗1(s, s)) (implying
∂D(s,s)
∂s > 0 in this range).
Step 2. Consider the (remaining) range of parameters where ∆s ∈ (∆sI ,∆sII) holds. First,
suppose that, in addition, s ≥ sII holds. In this case, we have e∗2(t∗2(s, s)) < e∗1(t∗1(s, s)) = 1
(see Propositions 2 and 3), which implies ∂D(s,s)∂s > 0 in this range of parameters. Second,
note that, in the region of the (s, s)-space where both ∆s ∈ (∆sI ,∆sII) and s ∈ [sI , sII) hold,
e∗1(t∗1(s, s)) = e∗2(t∗2(s, s)) is equivalent to
1
2
(
s+ λ
1 + 2λ
)
=
1
2
(
∆s−√1 + 2λ+ 1
)
⇔ s =
(
1 + 2λ
2λ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>1
· s+
(
λ+ (1 + 2λ)(
√
1 + 2λ− 1)
2λ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
,
(30)
which follows from Propositions 1, 2, and 3.
To summarize what we have learned from Steps 1 and 2 sofar, in the parameter region where
both ∆s < ∆sII and s ≥ sI hold, the boundary function s˜(s) is defined (a) by s˜(s) = s+ ∆sII
if s ≥ sII −∆sII , and (b) by (30) (and located as depicted in Figure 12) if s ≤ sII −∆sII .
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Finally, consider the region of the (s, s)-space, where both ∆s ∈ (∆sI ,∆sII) and s < sI hold
(where such (s, s) may or may not exist). In this region of the parameter space, e∗1(t∗1(s, s)) =
e∗2(t∗2(s, s)) is equivalent to (see Propositions 1, 2, and 3):
1
2

(
2t
′′
+ λ
)
+ λ
1 + 2λ
 = 1
2
(
∆s−√1 + 2λ+ 1
)
, (31)
and hence, in this parameter range, the boundary function s˜(s) is a line parallel to the main
diagonal, where e∗1(t∗1(s, s)) > (<)e∗2(t∗2(s, s)) to the left (right) of this line. Moreover, indepen-
dent of the existence of pairs (s, s) that satisfy both ∆s ∈ (∆sI ,∆sII) and s < sI , the above
discussion implies that, for s ≤ sII − ∆sII , the boundary function s˜(s) is (piece-wise) linear
and increasing in s, and it satisfies s˜(s = λ) < λ + ∆sII and s˜(s = sII −∆sII) = sII , which
concludes the proof.
E Proof of Proposition 6
In the proof of Proposition 6, we maintain the following two assumptions. First, if, at date
4, the agent is indifferent between leaving and staying, he stays (see footnote 13). Second,
consider a given pair of contracts and suppose that both generate the same effort incentives
(i.e., given truth-telling and taking into account optimal ex-post participation decisions, the
agent’s payoff as a function of his effort choice e is the same under both contracts). Then, the
agent chooses the same effort level under both contracts (i.e., potentially arising indifferences
are resolved in the same way).
For a given contract (τ(ê, ŝ; s), τ0(ê, ŝ)) in T define sets of effort levels E
S(s) ≡ {e / given
e and s, in equilibrium the agent stays} and EL(s) ≡ {e / given e and s, in equilibrium the
agent leaves}. We first establish the following result, which proves the first part of Proposition
6.
Lemma 11 (Restriction to T˜ is without loss of generality) For any contract (τ(ê, ŝ; s),
τ0(ê, ŝ)) in T , there exist threshold values e˜(s), e˜(s) ∈ < and payments τ˜(s), τ˜(s), τ˜0 ≥ 0 satis-
fying τ˜(s) = λe˜(s) + τ˜0 for all s ∈ {s, s} (where e˜() and τ˜() are functions of the verifiable gross
profit only) such that
(i) for s given, (a) if e ∈ ES(s), then e ≤ e˜(s) and the agent receives the payment τ˜(s), and
(b) if e ∈ EL(s), then e ≥ e˜(s) and the agent receives the payment τ˜0, and
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(ii) the message-independent contract (τ˜(s), τ˜(s), τ˜0) leads to the same equilibrium outcome.
The proof of Lemma 11 proceeds in five steps. In Steps 1-3 we establish some preliminary
results, which are used in Steps 4-5 to establish Lemma 11.
Step 1. Take s as given. We first show that for all e ∈ ES(s) the equilibrium payment
τ(e, s; s) cannot vary in e. This is trivially satisfied if ES(s) is a singleton, and hence suppose
that this is not the case. For any pair e′, e′′ ∈ ES(s), (14) implies that both
max
{
τ(e′, s, s), λe′ + τ0(e′, s)
} ≥ τ(e′′, s, s)⇔ τ(e′, s, s) ≥ τ(e′′, s, s) and (32)
max
{
τ(e′′, s, s), λe′′ + τ0(e′′, s)
} ≥ τ(e′, s, s)⇔ τ(e′′, s, s) ≥ τ(e′, s, s) (33)
have to hold, which can only be satisfied if τ(e′′, s, s) = τ(e′, s, s). To summarize, τ(e, s; s) ≡
τ˜(s) for all e ∈ ES(s), where τ˜(s) may vary in the realized, verifiable gross profit s ∈ {s, s}.
Step 2. Take s as given. An analogous argument as in Step 1 implies that for all e ∈ EL(s)
the equilibrium payment τ0(e, s) cannot vary in e, i.e., τ0(e, s) ≡ x0(s) for all e ∈ EL(s), where
(so far) we do not ruled out that the equilibrium payment x0(s) may depend on the agent’s
report about the realized state.
Step 3. For s given, suppose ES(s), EL(s) 6= ∅. For this case, we show that truth-telling
implies that there exists a threshold value ε(s) such that (i) e ∈ ES(s) implies e ≤ ε(s), and
(ii) e ∈ EL(s) implies e ≥ ε(s), where ε(s) is implicitly defined by
τ˜(s) = λ · ε(s) + x0(s). (34)
First, consider EL(s). If ε(s) ≤ 0 would hold, then the claim with respect to EL(s) would be
trivially satisfied. Hence, suppose ε(s) > 0, and, contrary to the above claim, assume that there
exist e′ ∈ EL(s) such that e′ < ε(s); implying max {τ(e′, s, s), λe′ + τ0(e′, s)} = λe′ + x0(s) <
τ˜(s), where the equality follows from e′ ∈ EL(s) and where the inequality follows from e′ < ε(s)
(which is equivalent to τ˜(s) > λe′+x0(s)). Hence, if e′ < ε(s) would hold, the agent’s incentive
compatibility condition (14) would be violated, because the agent could obtain the larger payoff
of τ˜(s) by, instead of truthfully reporting e′, switch to some false report e′′ ∈ ES(s). Hence,
e ≥ ε(s) for all e ∈ EL(s). Second, consider ES(s). A completely analogous argument (which
we, therefore, omit) implies the claim with respect to ES(s).
Step 4. Building on Steps 1-3, we now prove Lemma 11 for the case that, for all s, it holds
that ES(s), EL(s) 6= ∅. For this case, we first establish that x0(s) ≡ τ˜0 has to hold for all
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s ∈ {s, s}. To see this, note that in the present case {EL(s) ∩ EL(s)} 6= ∅ (see the discussion
of the threshold values ε(s) in Step 3), and (14) in combination with Step 2 implies that for
all e ∈ {EL(s) ∩ EL(s)} both λe + x0(s) ≥ λe + x0(s) and λe + x0(s) ≥ λe + x0(s) have to
hold. This can only be satisfied if x0(s) ≡ τ˜0 for all s ∈ {s, s}. This observation implies that,
in the present case, we indeed have ε(s) = e˜(s) ∀s (where e˜(s) is defined in Lemma 11). For
the present case, these observations prove part (i) of Lemma 11. Moreover, these observations
imply that both the contract (τ(ê, ŝ; s), τ0(ê, ŝ)) and the contract (τ˜(s), τ˜(s), τ˜0)) imply the
same sets ES(s) and EL(s) for all s ∈ {s, s}. Hence, for all e and all s, both contracts lead to
the same ex-post participation decisions and payments to the agent; implying that the agent’s
effort incentives under both contracts are identical. As a result, both contracts lead to the
same equilibrium outcome, which, for the present case, proves part (ii) of Lemma 11.
Step 5. Building on Steps 1-3, we now prove Lemma 11 for the remaining cases (where
ES(s), EL(s) 6= ∅ does not hold for all s). For each of the remaining cases, we derive some
observations with respect to the threshold values e˜(s) and e˜(s) and the payments τ˜(s), τ˜(s),
and τ˜0. These observations in combination with a similar reasoning as in Step 4 will imply
the Proposition for the respective case, where, due to its similarity to Step 4, this latter step
is, however, omitted from the proof. First, suppose EL(s) = EL(s) = [0, 1], where a similar
reasoning as in Step 4 implies that x0(s) = x0(s) ≡ τ˜0 > 0 has to hold. Additionally, define
τ˜(s) ≡ 0 for all s, and implicitly define e˜(s) by 0 = λe˜(s) + τ˜0 for all s, where, due to τ˜0 > 0,
we have e˜(s) < 0. Second, suppose ES(s) = ES(s) = [0, 1]; implying that, depending on the
realized state, the agent receives a payment τ˜(s) or τ˜(s). Additionally, define τ˜0 ≡ 0, in which
case e˜(s) is implicitly defined by τ˜(s) = λe˜(s) for all s, where due to ES(s) = ES(s) = [0, 1]
we have e˜(s) ≥ 1. Third, suppose EL(s) = ES(s) = [0, 1]; implying that in state s the agent
receives a payment τ˜(s), while in state s he receives x0(s), where x0(s) > 0. In this case, (14) in
combination with Steps 1 and 2 implies that, given the contract (τ(ê, ŝ; s), τ0(ê, ŝ)), it must be
the case that τ˜(s) ≥ λe+x0(s) for all e. Hence, define τ˜(s) ≡ 0 and τ˜0 ≡ x0(s); implying e˜(s) <
0 and e˜(s) ≥ 1. The proof for the case EL(s) = ES(s) = [0, 1] is completely analogous and
therefore omitted. Fourth, suppose EL(s) ⊂ [0, 1] = ES(s). In this case, (14) in combination
with Steps 1 and 2 again implies that, under the contract (τ(ê, ŝ; s), τ0(ê, ŝ)), it must be the
case that τ˜(s) ≥ λe+ x0(s) holds for all e. Now, define τ˜0 ≡ x0(s), which in combination with
τ˜(s) ≥ λe+ τ˜0 ∀e implies e˜(s) ≥ 1. Also, as in the present case, in state s the agent leaves for
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some e but stays for others, Steps 3 and 4 imply that e˜(s) = ε(s) ∈ [0, 1). The proof for the
case EL(s) ⊂ [0, 1] = ES(s) is completely analogous and therefore omitted. Finally, suppose
ES(s) ⊂ [0, 1] = EL(s). In this case, it follows from Step 4 that x0(s) = x0(s) ≡ τ˜0 > 0. Define
τ˜(s) ≡ 0, and hence λe˜(s) + τ˜0 = 0 implies e˜(s) = ε(s) < 0. Also, it follows from Steps 3 and 4
that ES(s) ⊂ [0, 1] implies e˜(s) = ε(s) ∈ [0, 1). The proof for the case ES(s) ⊂ [0, 1] = EL(s)
is completely analogous and therefore omitted. This concludes the proof of Lemma 11.
We now turn to the proof of the second part of Proposition 6, where the proof consists of
two parts (Lemmas 12 and 13).
Lemma 12 (No strictly positive payment when the gross profit is zero) For any con-
tract (τ˜(s), τ˜(s), τ˜0) in T˜ satisfying τ˜0 > 0 there exists an alternative contract in T˜ that specifies
a payment of zero when the gross profit is zero and that yields the principal a strictly higher
payoff.
The proof of Lemma 12 proceeds in two steps. In Step 1, we show that, if τ˜0 > 0 holds,
without loss of generality, one can restrict attention to contracts satisfying τ˜(s) ≥ τ˜0 for all
s. Building on this result, in Step 2 we show that any such contract is dominated by some
contract specifying τ˜0 = 0.
Step 1. Take a contract (τ˜(s), τ˜(s), τ˜0) with τ˜0 > 0 as given and suppose that there exists
some s such that τ˜(s) < τ˜0. Without loss of generality, suppose τ˜(s) < τ˜0, and consider
the alternative contract (τ˜0, τ˜(s), τ˜0). In state s, under both the original and the alternative
contract the agent’s ex-post participation behavior and the payoffs he obtains are exactly the
same (because the specified payments are exactly the same). In state s, under the original
contract, for all e, the agent leaves (because τ˜(s) < λe + τ˜0 ∀e), and he receives a payment
of τ˜0. Under the alternative contract, we have τ˜0 < (=)λe + τ˜0 for e > 0 (e = 0), and
hence (as under the original contract) the agent leaves and receives τ˜0 for all e > 0. For
e = 0, under the alternative contract the agent would stay (because he is indifferent), but
again receive τ˜0. Consequently, from the principal’s perspective, both contracts generate the
same effort incentives and payments to the agent. Moreover, if e = 0 would indeed be chosen in
equilibrium, the principal would be better off under the alternative contract because it induces
participation. Consequently, without loss of generality one can restrict attention to contracts
(τ˜(s), τ˜(s), τ˜0) satisfying τ˜(s)− τ˜0 ≥ 0 for all s.
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Step 2. Take a contract (τ˜(s), τ˜(s), τ˜0) with τ˜0 > 0 as given and suppose τ˜(s) − τ˜0 ≥ 0
for all s. First, consider the agent’s ex-post participation decision. For given e, the agent
stays with the principal if τ˜(s) ≥ λe+ τ˜0 ⇔ τ˜(s)− τ˜0 ≥ λe holds. Now, define an alternative
contract (t, t, 0), where t ≡ τ˜(s) − τ˜0 ≥ 0 and t ≡ τ˜(s) − τ˜0 ≥ 0. This alternative contract
yields the same ex-post participation behavior as the original contract (τ˜(s), τ˜(s), τ˜0). Second,
consider the agent’s effort incentives. When choosing his effort level, under the original contract
(τ˜(s), τ˜(s), τ˜0), the agent’s objective function is given by
e ·max(τ˜(s), λe+ τ˜0) + (1− e) ·max(τ˜(s), λe+ τ˜0)− c(e) (35)
Under the alternative contract (t, t, 0), in each contingency the payment to the agent is reduced
by τ˜0, and hence the agent’s objective function can be written as
[e ·max(τ˜(s), λe+ τ˜0) + (1− e) ·max(τ˜(s), λe+ τ˜0)− c(e)]− τ˜0. (36)
Hence, under both contracts the agent faces identical effort incentives and chooses the same
equilibrium effort level. Third, as under both contracts choosing e = 0 would be feasible
(which in either case would yield the agent a non-negative payoff), under both contracts the
agent’s ex-ante participation constraint is satisfied. Finally, as under the alternative contract
the expected payment to the agent is reduced by τ˜0 > 0, the principal is strictly better off
under the alternative contract. This concludes the proof of Lemma 12.
Lemma 12 shows that, without loss of generality, one can restrict attention to contracts in
T˜ that satisfy τ˜0 = 0. Now, consider contracts (τ˜(s), τ˜(s), τ˜0) in T˜ that satisfy τ˜(s) > τ˜(s) ≥
τ˜0 = 0, and denote this subset of contracts by T
−.
Lemma 13 (No reward for low gross profit) For any contract in T−, there exists an al-
ternative contract (τ˜(s), τ˜(s), τ˜0) in T˜ that satisfies τ˜(s) ≥ τ˜(s) ≥ τ˜0 = 0 and that yields the
principal a strictly higher payoff.
In order to prove Lemma 13, we first characterize optimal agent behavior across T−, then
derive optimal contracts in T−, and subsequently we show that contracts in T− are strictly
dominated. For ease of notation (and consistent with the main body of the paper), define
t ≡ τ˜(s), t ≡ τ˜(s), and t ≡ (t, t). Applying an analogous reasoning as that above Lemma 2 (see
Section 3), it is straightforward to show that, for a given contract t ∈ T− and optimal ex-post
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participation decisions, the agent’s expected payoff is given by
U(e, t) =

U−2 (e, t) ≡ e · t+ (1− e) · t− 12e2 if e ∈ E−2 (t) ≡ {e | e ≤ tλ}
U−1 (e, t) ≡ e · λe+ (1− e) · t− 12e2 if e ∈ E−1 (t) ≡ {e | tλ < e ≤ tλ}
U−0 (e, t) ≡ λe− 12e2 if e ∈ E−0 (t) ≡ {e | e > tλ},
(37)
where (a) E−2 (t), E
−
1 (t), E
−
0 (t) 6= ∅ for t < λ, (b) E−2 (t), E−1 (t) 6= ∅ and E−0 (t) = ∅ for
t < λ ≤ t, and (c) E−2 (t) 6= ∅ and E−1 (t) = E−0 (t) = ∅ for t ≥ λ. Moreover, note that, for
t ∈ T−, U(e, t) is continuous in e, U−2 (e, t) and U−0 (e, t) are strictly concave in e, and U−1 (e, t)
is strictly concave in e if and only if λ < 12 . Hence, for any t ∈ T− the agent either stays in
both states, leaves in both states, or stays in the bad state s only.
We now turn to the agent’s optimal choice of effort level given a contract t ∈ T−. Note
that U−2 (e, t) is strictly decreasing in e, and hence in the set E
−
2 (t) the optimal effort level is
given by e = 0; implying that the agent’s maximum payoff in E−2 (t) is given by U
−
2 (0, t) = t.
Next, we show that E−1 (t) 6= ∅ implies e∗(t) /∈ E−1 (t). To prove this, we show that
U−1 (e, t) < t for all e ∈ E−1 (t) (where, recall, t is the payoff the agent could obtain in E−2 (t)).
On the one hand, note that U−1 (e, t) = (λ − 12)e2 − et + t < t if λ − 12 < 0 (because e > 0 for
all e ∈ E−1 (t), which follows from (37)). On the other hand, if λ− 12 ≥ 0 (i.e., when U−1 (e, t) is
weakly convex in e), then the continuity of U(e, t) implies that, for the claim to hold true, it
suffices to check whether the claim holds at the upper bound of E−1 (t). This is indeed the case
because U−1 (
t
λ , t) = t− 12
(
t
λ
)2
< t, which follows from t > t ≥ 0 (see the definition of T−).
The fact that e∗(t) /∈ E−1 (t) if E−1 (t) 6= ∅ in combination with the above stated properties
of U(e, t) (see (37)) implies that e∗(t) = 0 ∈ E−2 (t) for all t ∈ T− that satisfy t ≥ λ. Moreover,
for the case t < λ it is straightforward to show that the optimal effort level in E−2 (t) yields the
agent a higher (lower) payoff than the optimal effort level in E−0 (t) if t > (<)U0 holds. Note
that U0 < λ. These observations imply that, for t ∈ T−, we have e∗(t) = 0 ∈ E−2 (t) if t ≥ U0,
and e∗(t) = min(λ, 1) ∈ E−0 (t) if t < U0. In the latter case, the principal’s payoff is equal to
zero because the agent leaves in both states of the world (see (9)). Moreover, in the former case
(i.e., for contracts t ∈ T− satisfying t ≥ U0), the above observations imply that the principal’s
payoff (see again (9)) is given by s− t. Hence, in this set of contracts, the principal optimally
sets t = U0 and obtains a payoff of s − U0, where we have s − U0 > s − λ > 0 (implying that
any contract t ∈ T− that induces the agent to leave in both states (resulting in a payoff of zero
for the principal) can never be optimal).
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Hence, to prove that contracts in T− cannot be optimal, it remains to show that, for any
(s, s), the contract that is globally optimal in the set T2 ∪ T1 yields the agent a payoff that is
strictly larger than s−U0. To see why this is true note that the contract (t′, t′) ∈ T2 would also
yield the principal a payoff of s− U0 (because ∆t = 0 implies e∗(t) = 0 and t′ = U0 holds (see
Proposition 1 and Definition 1)). However, as is apparent from Proposition 2 there does not
exist (s, s) such that (t
′
, t
′
) is an optimal no-separation contract, which necessarily implies that,
for all (s, s), the optimal no-separation contract yields the principal a strictly higher payoff.
Hence, contracts in T− can never be optimal. This concludes the proof of Lemma 13 and the
proof of the second part of Proposition 6.
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